

Trading-Raiding, A Family Business: Piratical Lineage in Early-Modern China

In the mid-sixteenth century, South China experienced a great explosion of maritime predation, commonly (mis)identified as the “Wokou (Japanese Raiders) Crisis.”¹ The imperial policies of the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) have largely been credited with causing this violence. In short, by prohibiting private seagoing activities, i.e., overseas trading and deep-sea fishing, the government pushed merchants and mariners towards illicit ventures.² Under these circumstances localized smuggling-trading and roving-raiding (hereafter trading-raiding)³ had long existed.⁴ As the government moved to suppress illicit exchange in the mid-sixteenth century, seaborne raiding proliferated along the coast. Littoral settlements suffered from hundreds of assaults perpetrated by Chinese and foreigners alike.⁵ In response, the Ming government dedicated immense resources to revitalizing coastal defenses and carrying out military campaigns.⁶ During these expeditions, field reports regularly claimed hundreds, if not thousands, of bandits had been eliminated.⁷ Even if one accepts some exaggeration in the numbers of people captured or killed, such claims raise an important question.⁸ How did trader-raiders persist in the face of repeated and immense defeats? One important means to survive in this violent world was, in a word, family.

Common descent groups played a significant role in the history of maritime predation both around the world and in China. On the global scale, in his classic study of maritime labor, Marcus Rediker identified that in the golden age of Caribbean-Atlantic piracy, more than seven out of every ten pirates active from 1716 to 1726 came from two origins, Benjamin Horningold and the Bahamas or the crews of George Lowther and Edward Low.⁹ In early-modern China, these kinds of connections also played an important role. For example, during the seventeenth century, the Zheng family from southern Fujian created a de facto, multigenerational monopoly over private Chinese seaborne operations between South China, Japan, and Southeast Asia. Similarly, at the turn of the nineteenth century, the Zheng family from central Guangdong commanded

an immense confederacy with a membership that has been estimated to reach into the hundreds of thousands.¹⁰

During the sixteenth-century coastal crisis in South China, family and lineage took on a special significance for littoral residents. For private subjects not engaged in trading-raiding, kinship ties played a key role in organizing defenses by facilitating the raising of militias and construction of fortifications.¹¹ Yet, adoption of Ming orthodox lineage practices also became a form of protection. For example, in Haiyan County, near Shanghai, lineage groups publicly aligned themselves with the government by adopting “imperial sanctioned ritual practices and the building of structures that conformed to acceptable architectural standards” for ancestral halls, thereby transforming themselves into model organizations of imperial ideals. Doing so provided “legitimation” or defense against accusations of engaging in illicit activities.¹²

On the other side, given the paucity of historical sources created by trader-raiders, any analysis of how kinship ties functioned inside their world remains dependent on limited outside observations.¹³ Nevertheless, family and lineage, based on both true and fictive relations, appears to have reinforced their operations.¹⁴ Along with real kinship relations, terms such as “evil progeny” (*yinie*) or “remnant confederate” (*yudang*) identify these kinds of connections. This essay explores the development and activities of two such lineage-based syndicates that emerged in the 1540s. Unlike the well-studied later Zheng families, the groups descended from Xu Dong and Li Dayong remain relatively unknown.¹⁵ Examining them not only provides insights into the varying ways individuals of both real and imagined kinship came together, but the research also highlights divergent examples of the influence these kinds of connections carried with them. Overall, reconstructing their histories reveals both the short-term existence of family-based trader-raider crews as well as the long-term emergence of lineage-based syndicates.¹⁶

Before turning to the trader-raiders, a brief geographical orientation should be helpful for the reader. Coastal South China refers to three provinces: Guangdong (southernmost), Fujian (central), and Zhejiang (northernmost). Historically, they were China’s gateways to, respectively, Japan, the Kingdom of Ryukyu, and the broader Indian Ocean world.¹⁷ While Zhejiangese are important to this story, the core of the present study focuses on people from two neighboring prefectures, Chaozhou in Guangdong and Zhangzhou in Fujian. Although a mountainous landscape limited their agricultural prospects on the continent, the Chaozhouese and Zhangzhouese found themselves propitiously positioned in maritime affairs. This region sits at the axis of sea routes that stretch from the Korean Peninsula and Japanese Archipelago through South China to insular and peninsular Southeast Asia. Many families in the area made the best of this situation and set to sea to make their fortunes.

Xu Dong's Family Tree

Late in his life Chaozhou-native Xu Dong¹⁸ made a choice that created a multigenerational trading-raiding syndicate.¹⁹ Yet, little information was recorded about him. Representative of other reports, the *Grand Record of Yue* contains a brief account: “[Xu] Dong is a native of Huanggang in Raoping [County, Chaozhou]. From his coming of age, he became a bandit and consorted with Japanese barbarians. He poisoned the sea for countless years, causing the people of Chaozhou to suffer.” Regardless of its brevity, several important points can be gleaned from the account. With Huanggang located near the shore, Xu Dong grew up with direct access to the sea. The location allowed him to build relations with overseas partners and even travel abroad during a career that spanned many years. In a final key piece of information, “[Xu] Dong did not have a son; he raised the Xie clan boy as his own son, calling him [Xu] Chaoguang.”²⁰ The “why” of this decision was simple enough: Xu Dong was older and lacked an heir. However, the “how” reveals it was no ordinary adoption. Only after killing the Xie boy’s father, taking his mother captive, and robbing their home did Xu Dong bring the boy into his household. These events left a deep impact on the child.

Some years later, in 1553, Xu Dong traveled to Kyushu in southwestern Japan. By this point, Xu Chaoguang had grown and amassed his own followers and power in this violent world. When his adoptive father returned, Xu Chaoguang moved to take over the syndicate. At a remote cove on the coast, he feigned welcoming Xu Dong home, but instead he took the opportunity to assassinate him. With Xu the elder gone and his own followers numbering in the thousands, Xu Chaoguang then established himself among the local strongmen.

By 1555, Xu had become a preeminent trader-raider in the Chaozhou area.²¹ Due to his rampant plundering along the coast, officials advocated negotiating pacification (*zhaofu*) with him. Xu accepted the offer and settled in coastal Piwang Village, while his forces were dispersed in settlements up and down the shoreline. Even if technically subdued, this sizable presence allowed Xu to exert influence over coastal waterways. He used this power to enact a protection racket on passing ships. When transiting the area, merchant vessels received a ticket that detailed payments to be delivered to Xu. His agents calculated the amount based on the value of goods aboard the ships.²² Xu’s pacification, even in such a limited fashion, did not last.

As the 1550s ended, an opportunity presented itself for Xu to collude with the Japanese. In early 1558, a small band of Japanese wokou, who were encamped in southern Fujian, launched attacks on towns in coastal Chaozhou.²³ At the same time, a large contingent appeared sacking settlements further north in Zhejiang, before sailing south into Fujian.²⁴ Over the spring and early summer, multiple groups ransacked northern Fujian and progressively made their way down the coast.²⁵ By September, they crossed the provincial border into Guangdong and set upon towns in Chaozhou.²⁶ As fall

turned into winter, the wokou began occupying smaller settlements and attempted to take over larger county towns. Over the course of 1559, they continued their campaign of plundering in the region.²⁷

Late in the year, with the rampant raiding possibly disrupting his extortion racket, Xu Chaoguang assembled several hundred followers and joined the thousands of wokou then plaguing Chaozhou. In particular, their combined strength emboldened them, and they set their sights on capturing military facilities.²⁸ While more hazardous than sacking smaller settlements or even county towns, if such an assault proved successful, the rewards—for example, seizing troop foodstuffs, military weaponry, or a more defensible position—could be well-worth the risk. Although the outposts withstood the attack, the situation in Chaozhou descended into general chaos by the turn of the new year.

While the government had struggled to subdue the marauders, early 1560 saw them finally make headway in curtailing the threat. In February, Xu's crew as well as the wokou had overextended themselves. Setting out from their bases, they attacked prosperous settlements along the coast, however government troops successfully repelled the invaders and then chased them away. In the aftermath of the battles, officials captured and beheaded hundreds of raiders. Following these and other defeats, the wokou fled from Chaozhou, while Xu took refuge in its remote areas.²⁹ What happened next is difficult to tell as Xu disappeared in the historical record for several years.

In 1563, when recruiting more soldiers to fight trader-raiders, Chaozhou officials worked to pacify Xu Chaoguang once again.³⁰ Since he had previously renounced an amnesty, local officials required Xu not only to declare an intention to give up trading-raiding, but he had to present himself before the prefectural government. Equally wary of their plans, Xu put forward a list of preconditions before he would enter Chaozhou city. These demands included keeping the city gates open with his men guarding them as well as allowing his personal retinue to remain armed and accompany him. If these conditions were met, he would attend a dinner banquet with the officials to discuss the terms of his pacification, but he was to leave immediately upon the feast ending. The officials agreed to his demands, and Xu again became pacified.

Xu Chaoguang's second pacification had two important developments. On the one hand, Xu and his followers moved onto Nan'ao Island, a nearshore isle on the Fujian-Guangdong border. They had been operating around the island and trading with wokou on it since 1558.³¹ In the early 1560s, planning a prolonged stay, they went so far as to build a stone-walled fort.³² Despite its relative closeness to the continent, islands like Nan'ao were not yet considered to have "entered the map" (*ru ban tu*) of direct imperial governance.³³ While the island presented certain strategic advantages, for example it had clear lines of sight and multiple deep-water coves, Nan'ao was not long occupied by them. The outbreak of disease soon forced them to abandon the site.

Afterwards, they moved back and forth between their ships and coastal settlements, before finally erecting a fort in Xu's hometown in coastal Chaozhou.³⁴

On the other hand, Xu joined the military in fighting his former compatriots. In fact, Xu participated in two important campaigns in the mid-1560s. First, in 1563, he was part of an expedition to liberate Xinghua Prefecture in central Fujian, which had recently fallen to raiders. Xu served in a naval contingent tasked with rounding up individuals attempting to escape to sea.³⁵ Second, later in 1565, Xu supported an operation against other trader-raiders, who had established their own base on Nan'ao. Like before, Xu was part of a naval force blockading the island to capture anyone trying to flee.³⁶ Nevertheless, despite claiming obeisance to Ming, Xu and his followers continued their extortion racket.³⁷

Mirroring his own entrance into the world of trading-raiding, Xu Chaoguang met a violent end in 1567.³⁸ After sailing through Piwang waters, Chen Canghai, a member of Xu's crew, was accused of breaking the rules about going to sea. Infuriated, Xu demanded he be brought to be punished. When presented, Chen professed his innocence and declared his loyalty to Xu. Convinced of his sincerity, Xu decided to pardon Chen. In this moment, Mo Yingjiao,³⁹ one of Xu's captains, took advantage of the situation. He killed both Xu and Chen. Claiming Chen's knife struck the fatal blow on Xu, he cast blame for the leader's death on the unfortunate subordinate. Afterwards, Mo established himself as the new leader. With fewer details recorded about Mo than even Xu Dong, the clearest point to be made is that his career lasted at least until 1574.⁴⁰ Ultimately, while Xu and Mo kept Xu Dong's syndicate alive, their sons' licentious lifestyles were said to have impoverished and ruined their families, which disappeared in the historical record upon Mo's death.⁴¹

Appearing to have been active from the 1540s to the early 1570s, the Xu Dong syndicate remained comparatively compact. Only three generations of sequential leadership (Xu Dong, Xu Chaoguang, and Mo Yingjiao) could be said to have kept it alive. Under the fourth generation, it declined to the point where the sons of neither Xu Chaoguang nor Mo Yingjiao were enough of a concern for their names to be recorded as influential trader-raiders. Furthermore, while Xu Dong traveled abroad, the historical record indicates Xu Chaoguang, and likely Mo Yingjiao too, remained locally based in eastern Guangdong. Nevertheless, despite not reaching far from its trunk, this lineage proved influential and resilient for more than twenty years in Chaozhou. In contrast to this tightness, the following lineage had many branches that stretched out far and wide.

Li Dayong's Family Tree

Once again, limited information was recorded about the progenitor of this syndicate.⁴² According to the *Chronicle of Dongli* (a small settlement in eastern Chaozhou), "[i]n 1544, seaborne thief Li Dayong invaded the Eastern Route," Chaozhou and Huizhou in eastern Guangdong. A Zhejiang-native "[Li] Dayong's thieves ships neared 100 vessels."

After government troops and local militias repelled his raids, Li and his followers retreated.⁴³ Although assembling a sizable number of ships and crewmates to sail them, the Li syndicate did not achieve remarkable success in its initial raids. However, this did not mean Li Dayong completely lacked position in this world.

By the early 1550s, Li had relations with two influential trader-raiders from outside the Chaozhou area, fellow Zhejiang-native Xu Weixue⁴⁴ and the Huizhou-native Wang Zhi.⁴⁵ During this period, people from these two areas had a privileged place in the history of trading-raiding. On the one hand, the Zhejiangese found themselves with easy access to Ningbo Prefecture, the arrival port for Japanese diplomatic missions to the Ming government. This placed them right on top of sea routes connecting East China with its neighbors to the northeast. After Ming prohibited future Japanese missions in 1548, the locals sat in a prime destination where wokou arrived in China.⁴⁶ On the other hand, hailing from the interior province Anhui, Huizhou merchants were an economic powerhouse.⁴⁷ By the mid-1540s, Wang Zhi, styling himself the “King of Huizhou” in Japan, emerged as one of the most influential potential partners in their overseas networks.⁴⁸ These connections not only would have aided Li personally, but through him, any benefits potentially extended to members of his syndicate.

After Li Dayong died in an apparent encounter with Ming forces,⁴⁹ his remnant followers split into three family-based crews under Shen Men, Tian Langguang, and Chaozhou-native Lin Guoxian.⁵⁰ While Shen initially tried to work along the coast, Lin and Tian turned to the syndicate’s connections abroad to establish themselves. One strategy commonly employed by Chinese raiders was to hire one or two seasoned Japanese sailors to captain their ships and then have the crew wear Japanese-style clothing. This gave them the appearance of being real Japanese wokou, a sight most terrifying to coastal residents. Adopting such an approach, Lin and Tian first sailed to Japan to recruit fighters. Later, in the islands, they ran into Shen, who had been forced away from Chaozhou, and together they decided to set off and raid settlements in South China.⁵¹

Sailing to central Zhejiang put Lin and the others into contact with associates of Li Dayong. In Taizhou, they met with Xu Weixue. Having previously collaborated with their mentor, if not the triumvirate themselves, Xu decided to make Lin a commander in his fleet and, as a result, came to be seen as Lin’s “godfather” (*ganfu*). To man his great ships, Xu assembled a large contingent of fighters; the number reportedly reached upwards of 10,000 mariners. With Ming troops actively confronting trader-raiders in the province, Lin convinced Xu to relocate to Chaozhou. After reestablishing themselves on Nan’ao Island, Lin next built a large residence for Xu nearby on the continent.⁵²

With other Huizhou leaders shifting their operations to the area, this marked a turning point in the locality’s place in the coastal crisis. During 1553 and 1554, Xu, Lin, and their compatriots began inviting wokou to use Nan’ao as a base for trading and raiding.⁵³ In fact, in the 1540s, local officials reported Nan’ao was a trader-raider

meeting place.⁵⁴ Getting wokou to come to the island appears to have restarted an earlier smuggler's market, known as the Japanese-Nan'ao Mutual Trade Market (*Wo zhi Nan'ao hushi*), which the government had attempted to shut down several decades earlier.⁵⁵ These developments proved transformative in the history of the syndicate. When Xu Weixue fell in battle against Ming troops in fall 1554, Lin Guoxian found himself with a well-armed and sizable following as well as operating from a reemerging hub of transregional trading-raiding.⁵⁶

Although Lin Guoxian's activities largely went unrecorded during the 1550s, marriage ties further strengthened the Li syndicate. At some point, notorious Zhangzhou-native Wu Ping married Lin Guoxian's niece. Whether this came before or after Wu began his own illicit career is not clear. It may have come as early as the mid-1550s. When Lin Guoxian built the residence for Xu Weixue, he erected it in Meiling, located on a peninsula near the Fujian-Guangdong boundary. Wu Ping's hometown, Sidu, sat a little north where the land began to protrude into the sea. This may have led to introductions between Lin and Wu, or the site may have been chosen because of Wu's presence. In either case, having someone like Wu Ping residing in between Xu and continental troops could have further reinforced the security of Lin's valuable ally.

By the early 1560s, Wu Ping had become powerful enough for his activities to be recorded.⁵⁷ Over the first half of the decade, he bounced between roving-raiding and negotiated pacification. In 1561, his crew captured villages along the Fujian-Guangdong border. The following year, they linked up with wokou and attacked military installations in Zhangzhou. Around 1564, he negotiated amnesty and resettled in Meiling. This pacification, though, proved short lived.

The following year, 1565, marked a turning point for Wu. First, in March, he again resumed raiding, repeatedly transgressing the provincial border in the process.⁵⁸ Second, his position in this violent world was elevated when Lin Guoxian died in a raid, making Wu the elder most member of the Li syndicate.⁵⁹ Third, with Ming troops pursuing him around Zhangzhou and Chaozhou, Wu moved offshore and occupied Nan'ao Island during the summer. To reinforce their defenses, his crew constructed fortifications made of wood and earth. Close to the shoreline, they built a palisade to secure a beachhead guaranteeing access to their ships, while further inland a larger and more defensible stockade was erected. Wu also had some of his followers continue to seek out assistance from littoral residents and plunder settlements when help was not freely given.⁶⁰ With the crew well dug in, removing them would be no simple task.

In the battle of Nan'ao, regional commanders (*zongbing*) Yu Dayou and Qi Jiguang, along with their respective family-run navy and army—the preeminent trader-raider hunters of the age—were able to evict Wu's crew.⁶¹ Yet, it took a remarkably complex battleplan. Stressing the urgency of the situation, Yu proposed a pincer attack with his sailors coming from Chaozhou in the south and Qi's soldiers from Zhangzhou in

the north.⁶² In total, they mustered some 3,000 troops for the expedition.⁶³ In October, with Yu's sailors quarantining the island, Qi's soldiers attacked the encampments ashore. After breaching the defenses, they killed more than 1,200 people. Additionally, the naval patrols (which enlisted Xu Chaoguang) caused some 5,000 of Wu's followers to die by drowning or burning aboard their ships.⁶⁴ Despite these heavy losses, Wu escaped and took refuge in coastal Chaozhou.⁶⁵

Next, Wu Ping gradually made his way westward. To escape from the forces of Yu and Qi, Wu and his followers stole more ships and took to sea.⁶⁶ Sailing across Guangdong over the winter, they pillaged coastal settlements to rebuild their strength. Moving further away from the Fujian-Guangdong borderland, however, made maintaining this fighting capacity progressively more difficult, and in time, the sailors under Yu Dayou's command started achieving greater success.⁶⁷ Finally, with the defeats piling up, Wu Ping met his end at a battle off Annam (northern Vietnam) in spring 1566.⁶⁸

Although the immense mustering of troops and resources required to eliminate Wu attest to the syndicate's strength, the loss of both Lin Guoxian and Wu Ping within roughly a year would have challenged its survival.⁶⁹ In such a precarious moment, the Li syndicate easily could have disintegrated or, at least, lost enough notoriety to slip beneath the liminal line of recorded history. In a remarkable twist, this infamous lineage still had not yet reached the apex of its power and influence.

Throughout world history, the passing of powerful leaders has produced notable rivalries amongst potential heirs that destabilized or destroyed dynasties. In a countervailing fashion, the deaths of Lin Guoxian and Wu Ping looked much more like the severing of the Lernaean Hydra's heads multiplying the number of threats. In other words, rather than their demises signaling a decline, new leaders emerged to organize their own family crews and overall strengthen the syndicate. For example, in the late 1560s, Wu Ping's "evil progeny" (*yinie*) Zeng Yiben, also a Zhangzhou-native, reassembled remnant members to raid across Fujian and Guangdong. They went so far as to even brazenly plunder the suburbs of the provincial capital, Guangzhou (Canton).⁷⁰ Similarly, from the late 1560s to the mid-1570s, Lin Guoxian's nephew, Lin Feng terrorized coastal settlements from Chaozhou-Zhangzhou in the east to Hainan Island in the west, Taiwan in the north to the Philippines in the south.⁷¹ Alongside them, numerous members of the syndicate stepped to the fore. One such leader emerged whose impact would be felt both near and far from his hometown in Chaozhou.

When the remnants of the syndicate reconstituted themselves after Wu Ping's death, Chaozhou-native Lin Daoqian, initially a member of Zeng Yiben's crew, rose to prominence.⁷² Around the time Wu fell in Annam, Lin appeared raiding along the Fujian-Guangdong border. First, in May 1566, he set upon settlements in southern Zhangzhou.⁷³ Then, after being pushed away from the continent, he took refuge in Bei Harbor on western Taiwan.⁷⁴ Eventually, he established himself back on Nan'ao

Island.⁷⁵ Next, to recruit shipmates and acquire vessels, he took over his hometown, a small settlement in coastal Chaozhou.⁷⁶ Doing so allowed Lin and his collaborators to amass some 3,000 followers, before setting out to raid western Guangdong. In the coming years, Lin became one of the most infamous local strongmen.⁷⁷ In fact, he became a known associate not only of other members of Li Dayong's syndicate but also Mo Yingjiao of the Xu syndicate.⁷⁸ In 1568, this notoriety led to a 1,000-*tael* bounty being placed on his head, 3,000 *taels* if he were captured alive.⁷⁹

Fearing his growing strength and unable to capture or eliminate him, officials tried to negotiate Lin Daoqian's pacification. By summer 1569, Lin had been offered and accepted amnesty.⁸⁰ Based on the negotiations, Lin was resettled in coastal Chaozhou.⁸¹ Due to his martial prowess, officials also recruited him to support military operations, where he achieved great success in battle.⁸² Although his willingness to fight for the government convinced many officials of his sincerity, not everyone trusted him.

At both the imperial and local levels, people remained wary of Lin's intentions as well as the impact his resettlement would have on the locality. The seniormost commander of troops in South China, Liu Tao wrote to Beijing, "[Lin Daoqian] alternatively rebels and comes to allegiance. I am greatly concerned that we are raising a tiger and this will result in future harm."⁸³ Furthermore, residents also feared what would come if former trader-raiders moved into the area. Would their presence lead other peaceful people to engage in illicit activities?⁸⁴ In the end, these concerns proved well founded.

Although holding back from raiding for several years, Lin Daoqian still had an impact on the area. On the one hand, he, along with fellow "pacified person" (*fumin*) Zhu Liangbao, enforced a protection racket, known as "water payments" (*baoshui*). While no details about the operations made their way into historical records, it was understood Lin enforced the system by terrorizing the local population: "Lin collected water payments and killed people as before. The commoners suffered and dared not speak of this injustice."⁸⁵ On the other hand, local gentry felt Lin's presence did more harm to the people, than the raiding by others in the area.⁸⁶ Along with the extortion, Lin "occupied mountain passes, gathered numerous people, [and] took over fertile fields," forcing peaceful peasants off the already limited arable land.⁸⁷ Lin clearly was anything but tranquil during his pacification.

In time, Lin Daoqian returned to his previous seagoing endeavors. In 1573, Lin rebelled, fled to sea, and sought refuge abroad.⁸⁸ During this period, Lin plied the waters from Taiwan to peninsular Southeast Asia.⁸⁹ After living abroad for half a decade, Lin finally returned home in fall 1578. When attacks on Siamese shipping resulted in greater losses than rewards, Lin Daoqian sailed back to Chaozhou to recover a silver cache and other goods buried there. Arriving back on the coast, he linked up with wokou and conducted raids along the southeast littoral. By the end of the year, Lin Daoqian, with his stores replenished, again sailed overseas to the Malaysian Peninsula.⁹⁰

At this point, Lin Daoqian, and consequently the Li syndicate he represented, became inextricably linked, not only with Chaozhou but also peninsular Southeast Asia. According to Ming government documents, diplomatic representatives of local kingdoms sought to use Lin's presence to ingratiate themselves with the Ming government. In spring 1580, with Lin using Patani and Siam as bases for his operations, emissaries offered to assist Ming in capturing him. In the fall, Cambodia made a similar offer, after their troops encountered Lin's crew in their territory. On this occasion, they even turned over several of his followers who had been seized in the confrontations. Although reluctant to proclaim how the foreigners would be rewarded for their assistance, the Ming government tacitly accepted the help in seizing one of its most troublesome subjects.⁹¹ In fact, with thousands of Patani-based raiders, quite possibly under Lin's leadership, attacking western Guangdong in 1580, there was a clear coalescing of Ming and foreign interests.⁹²

Contrastingly, based on Southeast Asian sources, Lin gained a prestigious position in the region.⁹³ Lin Daoqian (Lim To Khiam in Malay) reportedly made important contributions to local polities. In Patani, he was credited with casting the first cannons possessed by the kingdom.⁹⁴ The importance of their production would have been twofold. As a northern Malay polity, Patani sat in a precarious position, closer to their Thai overlords than their southern Malay neighbors.⁹⁵ In fact, there had been repeated conflicts between them in the mid-sixteenth century.⁹⁶ This gave the cannons a strategic importance in demonstrating Patani military power. Additionally, the Patani believed the cannons possessed spiritual power. Consequently, obtaining this gunpowder technology strengthened the kingdom by imbuing upon it a divine power.⁹⁷ As a result, the person who provided the weapons achieved an elevated status. Lin was further said to have ingratiated himself to the local population in myriad ways, for example by fighting Annamese invaders, converting to Islam, building mosques, and even marrying into the royal family.⁹⁸

Having relocated to the area with a large following from South China, Lin also came to be recognized as the progenitor of the local Chinese community.⁹⁹ Patani had long been a destination for Chinese seafarers.¹⁰⁰ Yet, Lin and his crew settling there coincided with a dramatic uptick in migration to and through the kingdom. For example, in the late sixteenth-century, Chinese rutters not only identified roundtrip routes from southern Fujian to Patani but also between Patani and other Southeast Asian ports.¹⁰¹ By the early 1610s, the number of Chinese residents had grown so much that they came to outnumber the indigenous Patani.¹⁰² Ultimately, Lin's connection to the polity grew to be so notable that it also became known as "Daoqian Port."¹⁰³ In the end, Lin had extended the Li syndicate's power and prestige far afield.

The legacy of Li Dayong's lineage remains open to interpretation. Last appearing in the historical record in 1580, Lin Daoqian may well have been the final active member, and with his disappearance, the lineage came to an end.¹⁰⁴ This would mean it

survived from Li's emergence in the early 1540s to Lin's disappearance or for, at least, five generations (Li Dayong, Lin Guoxian, Wu Ping, Zeng Yiben, and Lin Daoqian), not including other contemporaneous crews like those of Lin Feng and Zhu Liangbao. Yet, a second understanding remains possible. In the late 1500s and early 1600s, the Patani monarchy employed local Chinese residents in the government.¹⁰⁵ If these individuals (among which at least one family hailed from Zhangzhou) had been among Lin's followers, it could indicate a transformation in the socioeconomic position of Li Dayong's lineage from an illicit trader-raider syndicate to one based on government officials and legitimate businessmen. In much the same way as Lin Daoqian has been viewed as a progenitor figure by later Chinese in the area, members of Li Dayong's syndicate may have been laying the foundation for their presence and success.¹⁰⁶ In this sense, the historical legacy of Li's lineage extends well beyond Lin Daoqian and the late sixteenth century.

Conclusion

Family and lineage, based on both true and fictive relations, appears to have strengthened trader-raider operations and created avenues for longer-term group survival. The social relations that were recorded in true and fictive kinship terms illuminate the complex connections in trader-raider society. For example, Xu Dong's "adoption" of Xu Chaoguang or Zeng Yiben's identification as Wu Ping's "evil progeny" reveal them on the local stage or intra-Chaozhou and intra-Zhangzhou levels. Their translocal or interprovincial (Guangdong-Fujian) presence emerges in Lin Guoxian's niece marrying Wu Ping. Moving further afield, Lin Guoxian working with Li Dayong and Xu Weixue becoming his "godfather" reveals them on the regional scale. Finally, Lin Daoqian's multifaceted history with Patani, whether marrying into the royal family as some claim or being regarded as the progenitor of the local Chinese community, highlight the transregional aspects of these connections. At each level, the economic side of these relationships was undoubtedly important, however the benefits gained there should not lead us to overlook their social elements.

Family and lineage connections helped trader-raider crews as well as larger syndicates survive in the face of consistent pressure from the government. These kinds of transgenerational linkages had multiple benefits. First, the connections ensured access to financial, technological, and human resources. Additionally, they created doorways into extralegal networks along the South China littoral as well as in port cities overseas. Most importantly, in a seemingly endless game of deadly Whac-a-Mole, kinship ties allowed for the rapid reconstitution of crews when leaders, even powerful ones, fell in battle. This repeated reemergence put constant pressure on littoral governance and pulled limited resources in multiple directions, forcing the government to make tough decisions as to which individual crews and larger syndicates constituted

the greatest threat. In other words, kinship ties muddled the waters as to who was the most threatening and reinforced the capacity for group survival over the long term.

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Notes

¹ In late imperial China, there were three such waves: 1522-1574, 1620-1684, and 1780-1810. See, Robert J. Antony, *Like Froth Floating on the Sea: The World of Pirates and Seafarers in Late Imperial South China* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Institute of East Asian Studies, 2003), 19, 22-28. Although foreigners, such as the Japanese, Portuguese, and Southeast Asians, unquestionably played a role in the eruption of violence, the Chinese accounted for most marauders. See, So, *Japanese Piracy*, 15-36; Tanaka Takeo, *Wakō to kangō bōeki: zōho*, ed. Murai Shōsuke (Tōkyō: Chikumashobō, 2012), 208-210.

² The general objective of the sea ban (*haijin*) was to sever connections between littoral populations and foreigners by prohibiting private maritime activities and funneling foreign trade into a state-controlled monopoly. The literature on the sea ban and maritime predation is extensive. Kwan-wai So wrote the classic English-language study of the coastal crisis, its causes and participants. More recently, Li Kangying has demonstrated Ming not only tried to restrict private exchange with the Japanese but all foreign states connected to China both by the sea and land. In the edited volume *Elusive Pirates, Pervasive Smugglers*, multiple chapters address this history from different angles. See Kwan-wai So, *Japanese Piracy in Ming China During the 16th Century* (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1975); Kangying Li, *The Ming Maritime Trade Policy in Transition, 1368 to 1567* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2010); Robert J. Antony, ed., *Elusive Pirates, Pervasive Smugglers: Violence and Clandestine Trade in the Greater China Seas* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2010).

³ As explained by historian Anthony Reid, the word “piracy” comes out of a European experience and was used “to justify military expansion at the expense of Asians.” Furthermore, “Asian languages use several expressions that modern scholarship has translated as piracy, although no real equivalence of meaning or associations can be assumed.” I agree and think we should look to the plurality of actions that constituted maritime predation and how they were understood in world history. In sixteenth-century China, smuggling-trading and roving-raiding were what have most commonly been translated as “piracy,” while in Chinese several terms identified them, i.e., sea bandit (*haidao*), sea thief (*haizei*), sea raider (*haikou*). As a result, I prefer to rely on vocabulary that highlights the actions of which they were accused. See, Anthony Reid, “Violence at Sea: Unpacking ‘Piracy’ in the Claims over Asian Seas,” in *Elusive Pirates, Pervasive Smugglers: Violence and Clandestine Trade in the Greater China Seas*, ed. Robert J. Anthony (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2010), 15.

⁴ For example, sea raiders were said to have begun operating in eastern Guangdong as early as 109 CE. In the Ming period, seaborne raiding started to reappear in Chaozhou and Zhangzhou prefectures, the geographical center of this study, in the late fifteenth century. See, Wu Ying, (Shunzhi) *Chaozhou fuzhi* (Chaozhou: Chaozhou shi difangzhi bangongshi, 2003), 7.3b, 7.13a; Luo Qingxiao, (Wanli 1572) *Zhangzhou fuzhi* (Taipei shi Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1965), 12.12b.

⁵ Chen Mouheng, *Mingdai wokou kaolüe* (Beijing: Remin chubanshe, 1957), 47-128.

⁶ On the challenges and successes of sixteenth-century Ming military reforms, see, Kenneth M. Swope, *A Dragon’s Head and a Serpent’s Tail: Ming China and the First Great East Asian War, 1592-1598* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2009), 13-41; Teddy Sim, ed., *The Maritime Defence of China: Ming General Qi Jiguang and Beyond*, ed. Teddy Sim (Singapore: Springer, 2017).

⁷ The *Ming Veritable Record* (a detailed account of the daily goings on at the emperor's court) repeatedly reveals such numbers. For example, in a single day in 1554, it details the beheading of 1,305 trader-raiders, while another 39 died at sea. See, *Ming shilu*, Jiajing 33rd year, 10th month, 11th day (November 5, 1554).

⁸ Reports from Zhu Wan, the supreme commander of coastal defenses in the late 1540s, point toward a somewhat accurate count. In his missives (*shu*) to the court, Zhu not only gave the overall numbers of prisoners, but to corroborate them, he also provided the individual names of trader-raiders. See, Zhu Wan, *Piyu zaji*, in *Siku quanshu cunme congye, ji bi, di qiba ce*, eds. Sun Yancheng and Jia Wei (Jinan: Qilu shushe, 1997), 4.47a-52a.

⁹ Marcus Rediker, *Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen, Pirates, and the Anglo-American Maritime World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 267-268; Marcus Rediker, "Under the Banner of King Death: The Social World of Anglo-American Pirates, 1716 to 1726," *The William and Mary Quarterly* 38, no. 2 (April 1981): 212-214.

¹⁰ The historiographies on either Zheng group are far too extensive to be identified in detail. On the Fujianese Zheng, see, Tonio Andrade, *Lost Colony: The Untold Story of China's First Great Victory over the West* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); Xing Hang, *Conflict and Commerce in Maritime East Asia: The Zheng Family and the Shaping of the Modern World, c. 1620-1720* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Tonio Andrade and Xing Hang, *Sea Rovers, Silver, and Samurai: Maritime East Asia in Global History, 1550-1700* (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai'i Press, 2016). On the Cantonese Zheng, see, Dian H. Murray, *Pirates of the South China Coast, 1790-1810* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987); Antony, *Like Froth Floating on the Sea*, 37-52.

¹¹ Zheng Zhenman, *Family Lineage Organization and Social Change in Ming and Qing Fujian*, ed. Michael Szonyi (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001), 208-210.

¹² Ivy M. Lim, *Lineage Society on the Southeastern Coast of China: The Impact of Japanese Piracy in the 16th Century* (Amherst, NY: Cambria Press, 2010), 2225, 4469, Kindle.

¹³ Due to limited insights into the syndicates' internal workings, potential comparisons between lineage organizations in broader Chinese society or secret societies, like the Tiandihui, of later Chinese history remain beyond the scope of the present study.

¹⁴ This article expands upon the idea of “bandit lines of descent” that I first articulated in my dissertation. See, J. Travis Shutz, “‘Raising Tigers Courts Disaster’: Maritime Marauding and Violence Control in Sixteenth-Century Ming China” (PhD dissertation, Binghamton University, 2021), 27-28.

¹⁵ Individual members of these groups or even pairings have appeared in various studies, but none examine the long-term linkages or the implications of these connections. For example, on Wu Ping, an important figure in the present study, see, Chang Tseng-hsin, *Mingji dongnan Zhongguo de haishang huodong* (Taipei: Zhongguo xueshu zhezuojia zhuyuanhui, 1988), 54-64. On Wu Ping and his subordinate Zeng Yiben, see, Lin Renchuan, *Mingmo Qingchu siren haishang maoyi* (Shanghai: Huadong shifan daxue chubanshe, 1987), 106-108.

¹⁶ In this work, I adopt Zheng Zhenman’s definition of “family lineage organization” (*jiazu zuzhi*). Zheng has defined “family” (*jia*) as “a group living together and owning property in common, linked by genuine or fictive kinship relations” and “lineage” (*zu*) as “a group whose members live and own property separately, but who form a group that is linked by genuine or fictive consanguineal relations and that claims descent from a common ancestor.” See, Zheng, *Family Lineage Organization*, 24.

¹⁷ During the Ming period, emissaries from Japan arrived in Ningbo Prefecture, Zhejiang, ones from Ryukyu first in Quanzhou and later Fuzhou in Fujian, and everyone from the southern seas in Guangzhou, Guangdong.

¹⁸ There were two Xu Dongs active in this world, one from Chaozhou and another from the influential Xu family in Jiangsu-Zhejiang. See, Xie Jie, *Qiantai wosuan* (China, 1595), 1.30b-31a, Wikimedia Commons; Lin R., *Mingmo Qingchu*, 99.

¹⁹ For accounts of Xu Dong and Xu Chaoguang, see, Lin Dachun, (Longqing) *Chaoyang Xianzhi* (Shanghai: Shanghai guji shudian, 1963), 2.16a-17b; Chen Tianzi, *Dongli zhi* (Raoping: Raoping xian difangzhi bianxuan weiyuanhui bangongshi, 2001), 60-61; Guo Zizhang, *Chaozhong zaji*, in *Chaozhou fuzhi*; *Chaozhong zaji* (Chaozhou: Chaozhou shi difangzhi bangongshi bianyin, 2003), 10.7b-9a; Guo Fei, *Yue daji* (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 2014), 913-914; Xie, *Qiantai wosuan*, 1.30b-31a; Wu, (Shunzhi) *Chaozhou fuzhi*, 7.19a-19b; Wang Dai, (Kangxi) *Chenghai Xianzhi* (Chaozhou: Chaozhou shi difangzhi bangongshi, 2004), 19.4b-5a; Zhou Shuoxun, (Qianlong) *Chaozhou fuzhi* (China, reprint 1893), 38.21b-22a.

²⁰ Guo F., *Yue daji*, 913.

²¹ The Longqing *Chaoyang County Gazetteer* (1572) places these events in 1553, Shunzhi *Chaozhou Prefecture Gazetteer* (1658) in 1557, Qianlong *Chaozhou Prefecture Gazetteer* (1762) in 1558. Given its closeness to the events, I think the Longqing-era gazetteer contains the more accurate date. See, Lin D., (Longqing) *Chaoyang xianzhi*, 2.16b; Wu, (Shunzhi) *Chaozhou fuzhi*, 7.19a; Zhou S., (Qianlong) *Chaozhou fuzhi*, 38.21b.

²² Known as “buying water” (*maishui*), this kind of extortion repeatedly appeared in maritime China. For example, in the seventeenth century, the Fujianese strongman Zheng Zhilong extracted “water payments” (*baoshui*) from vessels passing near the Penghu Islands in the Taiwan Strait. See, Iwao Seichi, “Li Tan, Chief of the Chinese Residents at Hirado, Japan in the Last Days of the Ming Dynasty,” *Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko* 17 (1958): 71-82; Xing Hang, *Conflict and Commerce in Maritime East Asia: The Zheng Family and the Shaping of the Modern World, c. 1620-1720* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 48; Antony, *Like Froth Floating on the Sea*, 118-121.

²³ Zheng Ruozeng, *Zhongguo bingshu jicheng di yishiliu ce: Chou haitu bian (er)*, ed. Wang Chunsheng (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1990), 308; Guo F., *Yue daji*, 914. This group only consisted of about 200 wokou and a dozen ships.

²⁴ Ming shilu, Jiajing 37th year, 3rd month, 16th day (April 4, 1558), 4th month, 4th day (April 21, 1558). This essay utilizes the 1962 edition of the *Ming Veritable Record* (*Ming shilu*) published by Academia Sinica in Taipei.

²⁵ Ming shilu, Jiajing 37th year, 5th month, 1st day (May 18, 1558), 6th month, 20th day (July 5, 1558), 7th month 13th day (July 27, 1558). This progression can also be seen in the *Chou haitu bian*, which was compiled by officials directly involved in the defensive campaign. Zheng R., *Chou haitu bian*, 347-349.

²⁶ Ming shilu, Jiajing 37th year, intercalary 7th month, 26th day (September 8, 1558).

²⁷ Guo F., *Yue daji*, 914-915; Guo Z., *Chaozhong zaji*, 10.9b; Wu, (Shunzhi) *Chaozhou fuzhi*, 7.20a.

²⁸ Lin D., (Longqing) *Chaoyang xianzhi*, 2.20a-20b; Guo Z., *Chaozhong zaji*, 10.10a-11a; Guo F., *Yue daji*, 915; Wu, (Shunzhi) *Chaozhou fuzhi*, 7.20a-20b. Named after the settlement they occupied, Xu’s crew were also referred to as the Piwang gang (*dang*).

²⁹ Zheng R., *Chou haitu bian*, 308-310; Lin D., (Longqing) *Chaoyang xianzhi*, 2.20b; Guo F., *Yue daji*, 915; Guo Z., *Chaozhong zaji*, 10.11a-11b; Wu, (Shunzhi) *Chaozhou fuzhi*, 7.20b-21a.

³⁰ On the broader effort to reinforce defenses against the raiding, see, Lin D., (Longqing) *Chaoyang xianzhi*, 2.22a-25a.

³¹ Zheng Ruozeng, *Riben yijian qiong he hua hai (xia)* (Beijing: Wenwu chubanshe, 2022), 6.5b.

³² Such an assertion of control proved so unsettling to officialdom that decades later it was still identified in provincial level chronicles. For example, the *Grand Record of Yue* (*Yue daji*) explains “Today, it is said that Nan’ao has Xu Chaoguang’s old fortress,” while also including Xu Chaoguang’s Lair (*ke*) in the *Guangdong Coastal Chart* (*Guangdong yanhai tu*). See, Guo F., *Yue daji*, 914, 947.

³³ For Nan’ao, this came in the late sixteenth century with the establishment of a garrison town (*zhen*) on the island. Beforehand, any official control remained limited to seasonal naval patrols on the lookout for trader-raiders or military expeditions carrying out elimination campaigns. See, Qi Chong, (Qianlong) *Nan’ao zhi* (China, reprint 1841), 1.2a.

³⁴ Wang D., (Kangxi) *Chenghai xianzhi*, 19.4b. At this point, Donghu fell under Chenghai County, not Haiyang County. In 1563, Chenghai was created by separating southern Haiyang, eastern Jieyang, and western Raoping to fashion a new county-level administration. See, Wang D., (Kangxi) *Chenghai Xianzhi*, 2.1a-1b.

³⁵ Ming shilu, Jiajing 42nd year, 4th month, 13th day (May 4th, 1563); Zheng Ruozeng, *Riben yijian*, 6.5b, 6.13b-14a; Qi Zuoguo, *Qi Shaobao nianpu qibian* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2003), 4.1b, 5a; Zhang Tingyu, *Mingshi* (China: Wu ying dian, 1739), 212.24a, Harvard Mirador Viewer.

³⁶ Qi Z., *Qi Shaobao nianpu qibian*, 5.43b-44a.

³⁷ When reporting on these events, Zheng Ruozeng pointed out although Xu Chaoguang said he accepted pacification, he took his ships to Piwang and was not inclined to being admirable. See, Zheng R., *Riben yijian*, 6.14a.

³⁸ Some chronicles place Xu’s death at an earlier date. In contrast, the Kangxi *Chenghai County Gazetteer* is the only one to identify a date after Xu Chaoguang was recorded supporting the campaign against Wu Ping in 1565.

³⁹ Mo Yingjiao was also known as Mo Yingfu.

⁴⁰ Ying et al., *Cangwu zongdu junmen zhi*, 230. Mo Yingjiao only briefly appears in the historical record, primarily when he assassinated Xu Chaoguang but also after going back on his own later pacification. However, he was infamous enough in his own right to have the location of his base in Chaozhou recorded in provincial level maps. See, Guo F., *Yue daji*, 947.

⁴¹ Chen T., *Dongli zhi*, 60-61; Wang D., (Kangxi) *Chenghai xianzhi*, 19.5a.

⁴² For accounts of Li Dayong, see, Chen T., *Dongli zhi*, 54; Wu, (Shunzhi) *Chaozhou fuzhi*, 7.17b; Liu Bian, (Kangxi) *Raoping xianzhi*; 24 juan (China: 1687), 13.4b, Harvard Mirador Viewer; Zhou S., (Qianlong) *Chaozhou fuzhi*, 38.19b-20a. These generally contain the same information in slightly different wordings.

⁴³ Chen T., *Dongli zhi*, 54.

⁴⁴ Xu Bixi, Xue Weixue, Xu Quan were the same person. See, Zhang Shiche and Zhou Xizhe, (Jiajing) *Ningbo fuzhi*: 42 juan (China: 1560), 22.11b, Harvard Mirador Viewer; Kwan-wai So, *Japanese Piracy in Ming China During the 16th Century* (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1975), 38.

⁴⁵ Wang Zhi also went by Wang Wufeng. Li Dayong only appeared in the *Ming Veritable Record* on one occasion, however in it, officials tied him to Wang Zhi and Xu Weixue. See, *Ming shilu*, Jiajing 33rd year, 5th month, 26th day (June 25, 1554).

⁴⁶ In 1523, competing Japanese missions arrived in Ningbo Prefecture. When someone attempted to bribe local officials to accept their side as the official embassy, violence exploded which engulfed coastal Zhejiang Province. With the Japanese missions only allowed to arrive once every ten years, it took two decades before they were officially notified of their ban. See, James Geiss, “The Chia-ching reign, 1522-1566,” in *The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 7: The Ming Dynasty, 1368-1644, Pt. I*, eds. Frederick W. Mote and Denis Twitchett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 490-495; Jurgis Elisonas, “The Inseparable Trinity: Japan’s Relations with China and Korea,” in *The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 4: Early Modern Japan*, eds. John W. Hall and James L. McClain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 237-239.

⁴⁷ For a comprehensive introduction to Huizhou, see, Joseph P. McDermott, *The Making of a New Rural Order in South China, I.: Village, Land, and Lineage in Huizhou, 900-1600* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) and *The Making of a New Rural Order in South China, II.: Merchants, Markets, and Lineages, 1500-1700* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020).

⁴⁸ For example, see, Piyada Chonlaworn, “Rebel with a Cause: Chinese Merchant-Pirates in Southeast Asia in the 16th Century,” in *The Maritime Defence of China: Ming General Qi Jiguang and Beyond*, ed. Teddy Sim (Singapore: Springer, 2017), 189-191; John E. Wills Jr., “Maritime China from Wang Chih to Shih Lang: Themes in Peripheral History,” in *From Ming to Ch’ing: Conquest, Region, and Continuity in Seventeenth-Century China*, eds. Jonathan Spence and John E. Wills Jr. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1979), 210-213.

⁴⁹ This date or details of the event was not recorded, but due to his appearance in the *Ming Veritable Record*, it could not have come before the early to mid-1550s.

⁵⁰ For accounts of Lin Guoxian, see, Chen T., *Dongli zhi*, 58-60; Wu, (Shunzhi) *Chaozhou fuzhi*, 7.25a-25b; Liu B., (Kangxi) *Raoping xianzhi*, 13.6b-7a; Zhou S., (Qianlong) *Chaozhou fuzhi*, 38a-38b.

⁵¹ While he did not garner the same level of attention as Lin Guoxian, Shen Men continued raiding with people from Huizhou. It appears he began operating from Gaozhou in western Guangdong. See, Zheng R., *Riben yijian*, 6.10a-10b.

⁵² Chen T., *Dongli zhi*, 58-59. This residence was located at Meiling, a small peninsula right across the provincial border in southern Fujian.

⁵³ Zheng R., *Riben yijian*, 6.4a-4b. Concurrently, the Portuguese were also engaging with the Japanese off Guangdong.

⁵⁴ Chen T., *Dongli zhi*, 166.

⁵⁵ Qi C., (Qianlong) *Nan'ao zhi*, 3.2a-2b, 11.35a.

⁵⁶ Ming shilu, Jiajing 33rd year, 10th month 11th day (November 5, 1554).

⁵⁷ Wu Ping's activities were recorded in local chronicles from both his native Zhangzhou and neighboring Chaozhou. The Zhangzhou materials are straightforward chronology alongside other bandit activities. The Chaozhou accounts provide more detail and explanation. Lin D., (Longqing) *Chaoyang xianzhi*, 2.25b-26a; Chen T., *Dongli zhi*, 60-61; Guo Z., *Chaozhong zaji*, 11.12b-13a; Luo Q., (Wanli 1572) *Zhangzhou fuzhi*, 12.15b-16a, 29.49b-50a, 33.50a; Min Mengde, (Wanli 1613) *Zhangzhou fuzhi* (Xiamen: Xiamen daxue chubanshe, 2012), 32.19a-19b; Wu, (Shunzhi) *Chaozhou fuzhi*, 7.26a-26b; Liu B., (Kangxi) *Raoping xianzhi*, 13.7a-7b; Zhou S., (Qianlong) *Chaozhou fuzhi*, 38.32b-33b.

⁵⁸ Luo Q., (Wanli) *Zhangzhou fuzhi*, 12.15b-16a, 29.49b-50a, 33.50a.

⁵⁹ Chen T., *Dongli zhi*, 60.

⁶⁰ Qi Z., *Qi Shaobao nianpu qibian*, 155.

⁶¹ Yu Dayou, the naval expert, and Qi Jiguang, the army specialist, were two of the most important military figures of the mid-sixteenth century. See, James F. Millinger and Chaoying Fang, “Ch’i Chi-kuang,” in *Dictionary of Ming Biography*, eds. L. Carrington Goodrich and Chaoying Fang (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 220-224; James F. Millinger, “Yü Ta-yu,” in in *Dictionary of Ming Biography*, eds. L. Carrington Goodrich and Chaoying Fang (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 1616-1618; Ray Huang, *1587, A Year of No Significance: The Ming Dynasty in Decline* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981), 156-188; Sim, *The Maritime Defence of China*.

⁶² Yu Dayou, *Zhengqitang quanji* (Shanghai: Shanghai cishu chubanshe, 2008), 323.

⁶³ Qi Z., *Qi Shaobao nianpu qibian*, 156-158.

⁶⁴ Qi Z., *Qi Shaobao nianpu qibian*, 158-165; Ming shilu, Jiajing 45th year, 1st month, 28th day (February 17, 1566); Chen T., *Dongli zhi*, 60.

⁶⁵ According to local legend, Wu Ping was aided in his effort to escape by the spirit of his sister, whom he had killed so she was not ravaged by Ming troops and buried with his treasure to protect it from discovery. See, Robert Antony, *The Golden Age of Piracy in China: A Short History with Documents* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2022), 71-73.

⁶⁶ Ming shilu, Jiajing 45th year, 1st month, 28th day (February 17, 1566); Qi Z., *Qi Shaobao nianpu qibian*, 165-168; Zhang T., *Mingshi*, 212.9a.

⁶⁷ Ouyang Can and Chen Yuchen, (Wanli) *Qiongzhou fuzhi* (Beijing: Shumu wenxian chubanshe, 1990), 246.

⁶⁸ Ming shilu, Jiajing 45th year, 4th month, 1st day (April 20, 1566); Qi Z. *Qi Shaobao nianpu qibian*, 169-171.

⁶⁹ Chen T., *Dongli zhi*, 60.

⁷⁰ On Zeng Yiben, see, Chen Xianbo, “Zeng Yiben zhibian yu Mingdai zhonghouqi Guangdong haifang de taozhan,” *Guojia hanghai* 10 (2015), 25-36; Chang, *Mingji dongnan*, 66-75; Lin R., *Mingmo Qingchu*, 107-108.

⁷¹ On Lin Feng's far-reaching activities, see, Li Qing, "Ming Wanli zhunian Zhongguo yu Xi shu Feilubin shouci jiaozhu kaoshu," *Lishi yanjiu* no. 3 (2021): 204-218; Tang Kaijian, "Ming Long-Wan zhiji Yuedong judao Lin Feng shiji xiaokao—yi Liu Yaohui "Dufu shuyi" zhong Lin Feng shiliao wei zhongxin no. 6 (2012): 43-65; J. Travis Shutz, "Old Hundred Names and Barbarians Fight the Pirates: Recruiting Auxiliaries for Late Ming Naval Operations," *Journal of Chinese Military History* 12 (2023): 142-187; J. Travis Shutz, "Limahong's Pirates, Ming Mariners, and Early Sino-Spanish Relations: The Pangasinan Campaign of 1575 and Global History from Below," *Philippine Studies Historical and Ethnographic Viewpoints* 6, no. 3-4 (2019): 315-342.

⁷² Guo F., *Yue daji*, 919-920. Lin Daoqian does not appear in contemporaneous local chronicles to the same degree as his predecessors. However, given the imperial-level attention garnered by trading-raiding at this point, he appears more regularly in field reports and the daily records of the emperor's court in Beijing. For accounts of Lin Daoqian, see, Wang D., (Kangxi) *Chenghai xianzhi*, 19.6b-7a; Zhou S., (Qianlong) *Chaozhou fuzhi*, 38.37a-38a; Qi C., (Qianlong) *Nan'ao zhi*, 8.36a.

⁷³ Min, (Wanli 1613) *Zhangzhou fuzhi*, 32.16b.

⁷⁴ Zhou, (Qianlong) *Chaozhou fuzhi*, 38.37a.

⁷⁵ Ming shilu, Jiajing 45th year, 9th month, 5th day (September 17, 1566).

⁷⁶ Chen Zilong, *Huang Ming jingshi wenbian: 504 juan, bu yi 4 juan* (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2002), 353.7b.

⁷⁷ Ming shilu, Longqing 1st year, 8th month, 6th day (September 8, 1567), Longqing 2nd year, 1st month, 28th day (February 25, 1568).

⁷⁸ Ying Jia, Ling Yunyi, and Liu Yaohui, *Cangwu zongdu junmenzhi* (Changsha: Yuelu shushe, 2015), 230.

⁷⁹ Ming shilu, Longqing 2nd year, 9th month, 29th day (October 19, 1568).

⁸⁰ Ming shilu, Longqing 3rd year, 6th month, 1st day (June 14, 1569).

⁸¹ Ming shilu, Longqing 3rd year, 10th month, 21st day (November 29, 1569); Lin D., (Longqing) *Chaoyang xianzhi*, 6.17b; Lin D., *Jingdan xiansheng wenji*, 15.10a.

⁸² Ming shilu, Longqing 3rd year, 12th month, 2nd day (January 7, 1570).

⁸³ Geoff Wade, translator, *Southeast Asia in the Ming Shi-lu: an open access resource*, Singapore: Asia Research Institute and the Singapore E-Press, National University of Singapore, <http://epress.nus.edu.sg/msl/reign/long-qing/year-3-month-6-day-1>, accessed May 22, 2024; Ming shilu, Longqing 3rd year, 6th month, 1st day (June 14, 1569).

⁸⁴ Lin D., (Longqing) *Chaoyang xianzhi*, 6.14b-15a.

⁸⁵ Ying et al., *Cangwu zongdu junmenzhi*, 230; Guo Z., *Chaozhong zaji*, 11.21a-21b; Wu, (Shunzhi) *Chaozhou fuzhi*, 7.32b-33a.

⁸⁶ Lin Dachun, *Jingdan Lin xiansheng wenji* (Chaoyang: Chaoyang guo shishuang bai lu zhai, 1935), 15.12a.

⁸⁷ Ming shilu, Longqing 6th year, 7th month, 30th day (September 6, 1572).

⁸⁸ Ming shilu, Wanli 1st year, 5th month, 14th day (June 13, 1573).

⁸⁹ Xu Shaowang, “Zaoqi Taiwan mishi: Lun wan Ming haikou Lin Daoqian zai Taiwan de huodong,” *Renwen ji shehui kexue jikan* 33, no. 1 (April 2021): 5-34.

⁹⁰ Ming shilu, Wanli 6th year, 9th month, 11th day (October 11, 1578), 10th month, 4th day (November 2, 1578), 11th month, 4th day (December 2, 1578).

⁹¹ Ming shilu, Wanli 8th year, intercalary 4th month, 14th day (May 26, 1580), 8th month, 25th day (October 3, 1580).

⁹² Ying et al., *Cangwu zongdu junmenzhi*, 238; Guo F., *Yue daji*, 920.

⁹³ The authenticity of stories about Lin Daoqian’s role in Patani history has been questioned: Were they myths created by later Chinese who sought to make a place for themselves in local history? Regardless of how closely they accord with historical reality, the point remains Lin and his sister Lin Guniang, who is worshipped as a goddess, do maintain an elevated position in the locality. On Lin Guniang, see, Tamaki Mitsuko, “The Prevalence of the Worship of Goddess Lin Guniang by the Ethnic Chinese in Southern Thailand” (G-SEC Working Paper no. 22, Center of Overseas Chinese Studies, Takushoku University, December 2007).

⁹⁴ See, Andries Teeuw and David K. Wyatt, trans., *Hikayat Patani The Story of Patani*, 2 Vols. (The Hague: Koninklijk Instituut, 1970), 152-154; David K. Wyatt, trans., “A Thai Version of Newbold’s ‘Hikayat Patani,’” *Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 40, no. 2 (December 1967): 22-24; Ibrahim Syukri, *The Malay Kingdom of Patani Sejarah Kerajaan Melayu Patani*, trans. Conner Bailey and John N. Miksic (Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books, 2005), 39-40. While the *Hikayat Patani* also included a Muslim from Rum in the story, Syukri states that Lim had converted to Islam.

⁹⁵ Barbara Andaya and Leonard Y. Andaya, *A History of Malaysia* (London: Macmillan Education Ltd., 1991), 68.

⁹⁶ See, Hung-guk Cho, “Thai-Malay Conflicts in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,” *International Area Review* 2, no. 2 (Fall 1999): 52-55.

⁹⁷ See, Barabra Andaya, “Gates, Elephants, Cannon and Drums: Symbols and Sounds in the Creation of a Patani Identity,” in *Ghosts of the Past in Southern Thailand: Essays on the History and Historiography of Patani*, ed. Patrick Jory (Singapore: National University of Singapore, 2013), 41-45.

⁹⁸ Francis R. Bradley, “Piracy, Smuggling, and Trade in the Rise of Patani, 1490-1600” *Journal of the Siam Society* 96 (2008): 39-42; Chonlaworn, “Rebel with a Cause, 195-198; Anthony Reid, “Patani as a Paradigm of Pluralism,” in *Ghosts of the Past in Southern Thailand: Essays on the History and Historiography of Patani*, ed. Patrick Jory (Singapore: National University of Singapore, 2013), 6-7, 11-13.

⁹⁹ Hsü Yun-tsiao, *Da Beinian shi* (Singapore: Nanyang bianyisuo, 1946), 120; Geoff Wade, “From Chaiya to Pahang: The Eastern Seaboard of the Peninsula as Recorded in Classical Chinese Texts,” in *Études sur l’histoire du sultanat de Patani*, eds. Daniel Perret, Ammarâ Sîsuchât, and Sombûn Thanasuk (Paris: École française d’Extrême-Orient, 2004), 77; G. William Skinner, *Chinese Society in Thailand: An Analytical History* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1957), 4-5. This position mirrored how some elements in his home area also looked upon Lin Daoqian favorably. See, Tang Lixing, *Merchants and Society in Modern China: From Guild to Chamber of Commerce* (New York: Routledge, 2017), 9-20.

¹⁰⁰ While imprisoned in Guangzhou in the early 1530s, Portuguese sailors observed Chinese traveling to Patani only to refuse to return to China. See, Donald Ferguson, *Letters from Portuguese Captives in Canton, Written in 1534 and 1536. With an Introduction on Portuguese Intercourse with China in the First Half of the Sixteenth Century* (Bombay: Education Society’s Steam Press, Byculla, 1902), 116.

¹⁰¹ See, *Shunfeng xiangsong*, f. 23r-24r, Bodleian Library at Oxford University; Geoff Wade, “The Patani Region in Chinese Texts of the 6th to the 19th Centuries,” in *Ghosts of the Past in Southern Thailand: Essays on the History and Historiography of Patani*, ed. Patrick Jory (Singapore: National University of Singapore, 2013), 76-82. In the early seventeenth century, the Dutch regarded Patani as a doorway to access China and Japan, where Chinese silk and porcelain were extensively traded. See, D.W. Davies, *A Primer of Dutch Seventeenth Century Overseas Trade* (The Hague: Springer Science + Business Media, B.V., 1961), 70.

¹⁰² John Anderson, *English Intercourse with Siam in the Seventeenth Century* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench Trübner, & Co., Ltd., 1890), 80.

¹⁰³ Zhang T., *Mingshi*, 323.17b; Wade, “The Patani Region in Chinese Texts,” 73.

¹⁰⁴ The other candidate to have been the last descendant standing was Lin Guoxian's nephew, Lin Feng. On June 2, 1589, the *Ming Veritable Record* discusses Li Mao and Chen Dele, known associates of Lin Feng, who had been active in western Guangdong. Yet, the last clearly identifiable dates for Lin's activities came in the late 1570s. See, Shutz, "Old Hundred Names and Barbarians Fight the Pirates," 174-175.

¹⁰⁵ Skinner, *Chinese Society in Thailand*, 5; Hsü, *Dabeinianshi*, 121-122.

¹⁰⁶ In her recent study, Mellisa Macauley has identified a "maritime Chaozhou" that emerged in the eighteenth century. This developed from translocal connections between Chaozhou and Southeast Asia due to the movement of Chaozhouese and their commercial success abroad. See, Melissa Macauley, *Distant Shores: Colonial Encounters on China's Maritime Frontier* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2021).