Social Justice and International Educational Policy in Chad

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This paper addresses considerations for social justice in education through a multi-discipline perspective. By combining theories from education policy, political science, and development, I argue for greater national level involvement in education policy using the context of the Republic of Chad as an example. Based on Chad's inherited, as well as present, education and government situation, changing the current implementation practices for education development will likely increase long term success in the adoption of new education policies and in building democratic governance capabilities. In addition, this article offers the terms non-economically self-determining countries and economically self-determining countries as useful considerations for policy change and as contributions to the theoretical understanding of education policy development.

Keywords: social justice, education policy, the Republic of Chad, development

INTRODUCTION

Education services are often provided in the context of a national emergency. On an international scale, some of the refugees from the famine and war in South Sudan are receiving education services in refugee camps in northern Chad. In situations like those in Chad, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), such as the United Nations, contract education specialists who teach primary education for refugees in the country because national governments are unable to provide services (Andrews et al., 2017). Other INGOs called international financial institutions (IFI), such as the World Bank, often provide loans for contracted education providers as well as education policy professionals who act as technical

assistants to advise the national government on the provision of education in emergencies and crises (Culbertson et al., 2016). The INGO, IFI, or an organization they contract with may also provide technical assistance specifically to the national education ministry to increase the ministry's ability to govern the education system. These organizations together are considered external education providers or EEPs. Most organizations are understood to be working toward the national government sustaining its own education system without external assistance as the long-term solution.

However, the conversation regarding the transition from EEPs to the national government does not seem to be occurring. As an introduction to the EEP perspectives of the transition issue, I present three vignettes that occurred during the initial phases of this research. First, at a small academic conference in the United States, I listened to a presentation from the senior member of an internationally well-respected education support organization. After the presentation, I asked how the speaker's organization generally planned the transition from education in emergencies, as with the Darfur refugees, to handing over the education responsibilities to the hosting government. We had a brief discussion about particular contexts, and we agreed the transition is not linear. Finally, the speaker specifically addressed the transition issue and said, "I don't know. That's a really good question." As a burgeoning researcher in public policy, I resolved to continue asking the question to other practitioners about policies regarding transition.

Later, at the same academic conference, a PhD student was discussing their summer research project in connection with an education non-governmental organization (NGO) in an African country lamenting that if the government did not approve the NGO's work every six months, the NGO would be shut down. I asked the student: if they were familiar with the history of colonialism and external influence throughout the country in which they were working, why would the reporting and approval requirements be a problem when the government seemed to be operating well within its oversight responsibilities? The student looked at me with a shocked expression. An awkward silence followed until someone changed the subject. The situation, the student's seeming presumptions, and possibly the attitude of the NGO itself, seemed to indicate the external education provider should not be under the responsible authority of the hosting government organization.

One final anecdote bridges the academic and practitioner perspectives of the education, transition, and social justice issues. I was the facilitator for a panel of professors and practitioners who were discussing their organizations' work in east African countries. I asked a university professor, who was also the senior leader of an education NGO, if their organization went through the national government for coordination of the NGO's programs. The professor paused for a contemplative moment and then said, "That's a good idea." Here, someone familiar with the difficulties of education provision in emergency contexts and the need for national self-sustainability of education programs from both the academic and NGO perspectives seemed to consider working with the hosting government as a novel concept.

The core of these three vignettes shows external education providers had not considered increasing the capability of a national government to provide public services to the population inside its borders. My experiences in these situations all show the same gap in conscious consideration for assisting the national education system in developing its agency, i.e. its ability to "act independently and make free choices" (Lewis & Clark, 2014, p. 2). Each EEP illustrated above had prioritized individual international education advocates and economic and financial efficiencies above the needs of the national government. The mélange of external interests was rarely focused on the national government. Because of the divergence of the two groups, the external education provider activities may negatively impact not only near-term education service provision, but these activities may have a longer term negative developmental impact on the recipient country.

Therefore, this article focuses on the lack of conversation regarding the transition from internationally provided and coordinated education in emergencies to national government provision of education, with a focus on and the ramifications for the social justice implications within the recipient country. I argue that external entities' consistent and widespread provision of education services undermines and weakens the recipient government. While I focus on the case of Chad to articulate this argument, the contention is generalizable to other countries in Africa as well as to other regions in the world. I begin explaining the foundations of the thesis in the first section using theories from political science and social justice to support this contention with specific attention to the external entity's impact on national education governance. Then, a brief history of Chad illuminates the country's complicated history and why the country is an

exemplar of the impact of external input in national education. Education policies in Chad will be used to demonstrate a possible link between increased external provisions of education and decreasing social justice. The third section also sets the tone for the following section on social justice perspectives. The last section addresses the political and sociological issues around the lack of social justice in Chad's education governance and provides concepts supporting agency for future policy consideration. The article concludes with recommendations for non-economically self-determining countries (NESD – referred to inaccurately in general parlance as *developing countries*) as well as recommendations for economically self-determining (ESD or *developed*) countries to consider when creating and implementing education development policies.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The 1648 Treaty of Westphalia was signed by multiple royal and religious entities in what is now Europe to end the 30-Years' War. The end of the conflict left the entities with a common framework for the delineation of countries. The parties agreed that there would be mutual respect of each country's *sovereignty*, including the ability for each to physically control its own geographic territory. Sovereignty is one of the aspects of Westphalia that was incorporated into the United Nations (UN) charter in 1945 and to which all nations who are party to the UN pledge their active support. Sovereignty, as the basis of individual country agency, is defined as the ability to act independently, make free choices, and the ability to make conscious decisions for oneself (Lewis & Clark College, 2014). Agency is implied as inherent in political science studies of government and governance. Agency and national sovereignty combine into concepts in which countries sustain their own governance without external support. Agency and sovereignty have been assumed in countries established since the Treaty of Westphalia but has not been assumed or widely recognized in practice within development studies until recently (Taylor, Rizvi, Langard, & Henry, 1997; Takala, 1998).

At the heart of the conceptual democratic construct is a social contract between citizen and government (Rouseau, 1762). The contract is founded on an earlier document. However, the social contract is based on and mostly applied in countries founded on Westphalian concepts, i.e. not originally attributed to former colonies. Often in international development, programs

are operated from an international level by the World Bank (WB) and other IFIs which can impact both national sovereignty and country agency. International development programs are ostensibly in place to assist governments in operating sustainably in the best interest of the host population. However, IFIs can employ what might be termed neo-liberal imperialism which acts to maintain significant external influence at best and external control at worst. (Zach-Williams & Mohan, 2005; Crain, 2009). The tendency of IFIs to not recognize and act on Westphalian principles or UN-mandated respect for sovereignty in contexts outside Europe gives rise to concerns of breaches of sovereignty and concerns for international principles of statehood (Crain, 2009; Gallagher, 2005).

Within the political science and development literature, the concept of *suzerainity* describes the fealty of governments to external entities. External fealty decreases internal accountability and weakens democracy by effectively robbing citizens of having a government that is constitutionally accountable to them (Mbembe, 2001). Suzerainity replaces the democratic social contract between citizens and governments (Rousseau, 1762) and effectively decreases citizens' viable agency as individual citizens, civic society groups, or political parties. Governments in the African context have a particularly long and well-documented history of acquiescing to external demands and priorities of international entities (Mbembe, 2001; Williams, 2003; Muhumuza, 2008). The WB and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) often override a country's the national priorities, such as those manifested through democratic elections (Mbembe, 2001; Geo-jaja, 2003; Williams, 2003). When the citizens' priorities go against the externally coerced recommendation of the external body, which are termed conditionalities, democracy, national will, and agency are effectively subjugated and suborned to non-elected entities (Eyoh, 1998; Matti, 2010). When suzerainty is a consistent and persistent factor of governance, accountability cannot coherently be addressed without considering external entities' internal impacts (Takala, 1998).

The theories of sovereignty and suzerainity at the international level can be mirrored at the social level as agency theory. Milgram (1974) applied agency to a study of obedience when an entity acts as the agent of another entity to its own detriment. The same study founded autonomy theory as being under one's own authority and acting on one's own choices (Milgram,

1974). Both theories deal with recognition of and obedience to an authority figure (Helm & Morelli, 1979).

Where Milgram's findings on how agency can be shaped by external entities are related to older conceptualizations of development, Edward Said's concept of agency regarding social justice is used more often in recent development theory literature (Anwaruddin, 2014). Said's perspectives on agency dealt more with an entity – either individual or country – becoming its own agent. Therefore, Said's work is more readily applicable to the current international development efforts which have shifted from previously accepted definitions of Westphalian sovereignty and suzerain imperialism to being more focused on principles of true country sovereignty, local accountability, and local agency. There is a move away from countries simply titled as democratic toward countries with government characteristics that are inviolable by other sovereign countries. While there is not an assumed specific proportionality between sovereignty, social justice, and democratic accountability, logic indicates external infringement in any of these areas goes against the primary tenants of democracy and will negatively impact other tenants of democratic practices. As an example, the Republic of Chad and other formerly colonized countries have met the requirement for external recognition based on Westphalian principles. Yet, the two major IFIs, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and WB, which were founded as the modern economic implementation of Westphalian principles, seemingly disregard the sovereignty of states and citizens which engenders concepts and constructs such as the opening three scenarios. Sovereignty, agency, and democratic principles at a national level are thereby undermined.

Understanding the political environment helps in understanding the nuances of a call for social justice by citizens in non-economically self-determining (NESD) countries. As Dr. Nancy Fraser (2005) points out, the major components of social justice – redistribution, recognition, and participatory justice – are relative to the context in which they are being applied. Further, the three components must include all aspects of society, including economic and political considerations, which are intrinsic to the recognition and participatory aspects of social justice. Fraser's discussion of each components' importance and the processes involved in creating social justice highlight extra-governmental education provision difficulties. Authors Tikly and Dachi (2008) state the issues and processes combined are especially problematic in the African

context given historic and current struggles against slavery, colonialism, and "the deepening of poverty and inequality under globalization" which they argue "is the most profound obstacle to realizing global rights" (Tikly & Dachi, 2008, p. 121).

The relationship between suzerain and social justice in the political realm is synonymous with external service provision and national policy sustainability in the education policy realm. Both are implemented at the behest of international financial institutions through conditionalities despite the lack of appropriate individual country applicability. Policies regarding governance, education, economics, or national priorities are rarely successful if they do not include cultural and contextual relevance (Farazmand, 1996). Policies which are made relevant by each applicable country maintain legitimacy as well as sovereign agency in both the short and long term. Further, since governments which are receiving external input on a long-term basis are likely also receiving assistance in multiple sectors, the country logically cannot be a just society because the government is more responsive to the external entity(ies) than to its citizens.

The subject of international-to-local relationship dynamics are inherent in research on changing education policies in development. Susan Robertson's (2008) writings offer several key considerations regarding globalizing education and the detriment to local citizens. First, she argues that national governments have a role in providing social cohesion, promoting meritocracy, and instilling democracy through education. Then she articulates the current fundamental shifts in the citizen and government responsibilities and boundaries on local, national, regional, and global levels. Finally, she points out how globalization is transforming the education governance beyond the control of national governments and local citizens through globalization's neo-liberal implementation mechanisms. "[Public private partnerships] are the World Bank's preferred solution to delivering the Millennium Development Goals for universal primary education and expanding the secondary [education] sector" (Robertson, 2008, p. 545) which decreases the claim-making ability of citizens against their democratically—if in name only—leaders. The result is an "economic constitutionalism" (Jayasuriya, 2001, p. 443) which prioritizes foreign economic ties over civic social contacts. Economic constitutionalism not only solidifies education commodification but inserts economic entities with economic and financial shareholder priorities which in turn displace governments' and citizens' agency. External entities then model their idea of the local ideal citizen based on anticipated global marketplace

requirements. The conflicting priorities change the fight for social justice being waged by the local citizenry of one country to a fight for social justice at a global level against all citizens and governments around the world as well as in the global marketplace. The local citizens are outmatched. Further, governments that are not providing education services to their citizens are likely also defined as fragile in terms of their overall functionality and have less ability to fight a two-sided conflict—for or against its own citizens and for or against external market forces. At this point government officials often abdicate the socially contracted obligations to their citizens for service provision like education; they allow external education provision of services to citizens, and the government falls further into a democratic deficit of social justice.

To illustrate the possible detriment of globalizing education and suzerain theories in a real context, education policies in Chad demonstrate a possible link between increased external provisions of education and decreasing social justice. The likelihood of a connection is based on the lack of accountability of the government to its citizens and the lack of capability of the government to satisfy internal as well as external requirements. While the research is not conclusive that only education, external entities, and current government are the sole variables responsible for the decreased responsiveness of government phenomenon, the theorization as discussed in this article and initial characterizations of the example situation in Chad are strong enough to broaden the concepts beyond education to other sectors of government in later research. The argumentation is especially relevant for other NESD countries in economic and governmental systems around the world which are similar to Chad.

BACKGROUND

The Republic of Chad exemplifies the divergent EEP and national concerns as well as the lack of national agency. The area currently known as the Republic of Chad has a long history (Table 1) of being a crossroads of culture, and indigenous knowledge systems have grown to reflect and perpetuate that heritage. Chad has a rich history of several ethnic groups which were patchworked together under French imperial control. Prior to the region's 1910 designation as a portion of French West Africa, the local indigenous education systems were typical of many indigenous communities everywhere in that youths, either as individuals or as cohorts, were trained by parents and community members in the specialty area of each community member. In

Table 1

Abbreviated History of Chad

1500s-1800s	Kanem-Bornu state commands southern portion of the Saharan trade routes north into Tripoli
1910 -1914	Kenembu dynasty reestablished under protection of the French government as French Equatorial Africa; pacification campaign
1958	Territorial autonomy referendum; Chad remains within the French community
1959	Francois Tombalbaye elected administrator and leads Chadian Progressive Party (PPT)
1960	Political independence from France
1962	President Tombalbaye outlaws all political parties except PPT; begins harsh discrimination and political incarceration especially of northerners and Muslims
1963	Tax revolt by northerners who form National Liberation Front of Chad (FROLINAT); civil war begins; Tombalbaye requests French assistance and troops
1975	President Tombalbaye assassinated; military rule from 1975-1978 under Malloum
1978	Malloum allies with FROLINAT and installs Habre as Prime Minister
1980	President Gaddafi (Libya) sends tanks into Chad regarding disputed Aouzou Strip and supports northern guerilla FRONILAT; civil war between Oueddi's FRONILAT and southerner Hassan Habre backed by France and USA ensues
1990	Habre ousted by military advisor Idriss Deby who establishes himself as President; multi-faction civil war continues
1990	Deby enters agreements with WB, IMF for economic reform, oil exploration
1996	Peace agreement between civil war factions is signed
1997	National elections install President Deby and the Patriotic Salvation Movement
2001	Deby obtains debt relief from IMF and other international
2003	Chad began receiving Darfur refugees; border incidents led to Chadian-Sudanese War
2005-2010	Chad civil war

this way, the youth were taught, to use modern terms, academic disciplines and trades, as well as social and civic norms and responsibilities. They were also taught that the needs of the community come before the needs of the individual (Fafunwa & Aisiku, 1982; Bassey, 1999).

The concepts of European individualism and education as being separate and distinct from one's community came with the French missionaries in the 1870s (Fafunwa & Aisiku, 1982). The French government further reinforced these concepts via its colonial education policies specific to their administration in French West Africa (Bassey, 1999). Local leaders became liaisons between the local populations and the French government. Throughout the colonizing period the French government reinforced the status of local leaders as French government agents. The local leaders showed more likelihood to act in their own and the French interests which, in many cases, supported the leaders against the local people (Bassey, 1999; Dimier, 2017). Elites acting in the interest of a foreign power was true in all major aspects of the government including education policy enforcement.

This agent governing structure deliberately created an elitist class separate from the majority of the African population. "The gatekeepers of education in their countries had corrupted the education system with hatred and bias, historically pitting one group against others" (West, 2013, p. 173). As an example, the French education policy for each territory depended on what export commodity France needed. The French-run administration would then adjust the education to a level which would facilitate the exploitation of that economic market structure. The British Royal Commission to West Africa outlawed literary subjects since the main purpose of education was that it be "sufficient education to enable him to write his name" and to be a source of assistance to white men as laborers which was appropriate for the Africans in their role as "a subject race" (Bassey, 1999, p. 32). The Belgian and Germany colonies, though smaller in number and size than their British and French counterparts, held largely the same views. In each colony, the educated elites were differentiated from their fellow Africans as well as from Europeans and were said to be—and in the cases of the French, Portuguese, and Belgian colonial government *created* to be—adept at working in both worlds. However, in many cases, they fit in neither. In Francophone West Africa they were called "*Africain déclassé*" – without social grouping (White, 1996, p. 16). In the latter stages of colonization, the elites used their education to help the African population harness their political desires for liberation against

the Europeans. "The elites translated what had been tribal and group resistance to the Europeans into 'nationalist' resistance" (Carnoy, 1974, p. 143). Such were the educational social justice foundations in Africa due to external actions prior to political independence.

The Republic of Chad gained independence from France in 1960. As with most countries which were newly and politically independent, Chad left many colonial policies and offices in place for a variety of reasons (most of which are beyond the scope of this article). The government's initial foundational document from 1958, which was a precursor to political independence, stated education would be secular, conducted in French with special consideration for Arabic, and that primary as well as secondary education would be free to all citizens (Nomaye, 2001). This policy was put in place because, "education is the fundamental right of the citizen" (Nomaye, 2001, p. 23). The right to free education for citizens was reiterated in the country's four constitutions adopted between 1960-2000. However, education service provision was difficult or non-existent especially during and after Chad's civil wars. The majority of Chad's conflicts were played out along French-exploited differences. Northern, Nilo-Saharan Muslims were largely educated in Saudi Arabian-sponsored Koranic schools. Southern, Niger-Congolese Christians were permitted to attend French schools in N'Djamena and later in France. Government service provision and resource allocation tended to decrease as one traveled further into northern Chad to the point that those in the northern areas became nearly autonomous.

President Habre's regime exemplified the worst of the north-south conflicts. Under his authority, from 1978 to 1990, the government committed crimes against humanity mostly in the northern areas and against northern people living in the south. The people in the northern areas attempted coups against the southern government; however, the Habre regime, supported by the French military, repelled the attacks. Habre was finally ousted in 1990. In 2015, Habre was convicted of multiple offenses by the International Criminal Court.

The Chadian postcolonial education system largely reflected the same curriculum and priorities as were in place under colonial rule. The French system in Chad belied the written constitutional equality of citizens by maintaining social and cultural differentiations in the quality of and access to education. French government practices further exacerbated colonial social distortions by favoring the southern, Sara people, who were converted to Christianity and elevated by the French to be geographically and civically dominant. The education system

continued privileging literacy and formal education to the Sara and to the children of government officials, political party officials, and those tied to ex-patriot French government officials (Dimier, 2017). The vast number of Chadians, who are without political or social capital, were relegated to the same uneducated status after independence as they had prior to independence.

President Idriss Deby was elected in 1990 via free and fair elections. He was re-elected in 1995 to a second, five-year term. However, the elections since 2000 have been increasingly scrutinized by national and international democracy advocacy groups because Deby has remained the President despite constitutional limits. During his tenure, he has presided over the creation of several national education planning documents (Table 2). For the most part, they have been created by intragovernmental committees representing education, labor, and health combined with external technical advisers from education providing businesses, international aid organizations, NGOs, supranational organizations, and IFIs. The national education documents synopsized in Table 2 emphasize the UNs Education For All (EFA) program goals with no noted specificity particular to Chad's unique history, government situation, or educational conditions. The WB project documents for Education Sector Reform from 2012-2017 for six of 22 regions in Chad (Figure 1) show the southern-based government's emphasis on primary school construction, teaching and learning materials provision, community teacher subsidy provision and transmission, and WB project monitoring and evaluation (WB, 2013a). All the projects are within the southern half of the country – an area which has been traditionally favored by elites and foreign entities. The WB documents state the educational structure of the national system is 33% community based. The high rate of reliance on the community and the low literacy rate occur despite the Ministry of Education's acknowledged responsibility because of the consistently low provision of education services by the national system due to war and other government priorities (WB, 2013b). The importance of community education, formal and informal education, the importance and goal of national identity development are codified in the 2006 *Loi no 16* National Education Legislation (Gouverment of Chad, 2006). These topics and priorities specific to the government of Chad are not addressed in the UN-based documents nor are they in the WB project and program documents.

Table 2

Republic of Chad National Education Documents 1999-2017

2002	Education for All National Action Plans (*Plan d'action national de l'education pour tous (PAN/EPT) a l'an 2015. Partie 1: Diagnostic et strategies*); developed by Chad and development partners; includes *de formation en liaison avec l'emploi (EFE)* [PPP] from 1993 (p. 8); solicit education provision assistance from partners (p. 13)
2004	Education for All National Action Plans (*Plan d'action national de l'education pour tous – PLAN/EPT – a l'an 2015*); assumed developed by Chad and development partners based on very similar wording to 2002 EFA National Action Plan
2005	United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks (*Plan cadre des Nations Unies pour l'aide au developpement du Tchad: saisir les opportunites de l'ere petroliere 2006-2010*); developed by Chad and the UN (cover); primary plan is cooperation with UN agencies (p. 11)
2006	National Education Legislations (*Loi n₀ 016/PR/06 du 13 mars 2006 portant orientation du Systeme educative tchadien*); developed by Chad; framework is the responsibility of the government; education is the absolute national priority; government guarantees education from 6 to 16 years old, education is secular; private education is under control of the government; the mission of the education system; description of the education system; addresses and includes informal education; personnel system; rights of students
2008	National Education Policy (*Chad: rapport national. 48e session de la Conference international de l'education, CIE: "L'education pour l'inclusion: la voie de l'avenir"*); developed by Chad; national education priorities with specific references national curriculum foci such as peace, solidarity, democracy, human principles, human rights; refers to new organization of the education system with national declarations from 2007 and 2008; includes provision for refugee children; in conjunction with UNICEF providing education in emergencies to refugees and opened secondary school to refugees
2012	National Education Policy (*Strategie interimaire pour l'education et l'alphabetisation 2013-2015 (SIPEA)*); developed by Chad intergovernmental body with the participation of "l'UNESCO, WB, l'AFD, de l'UNICEF, du PAM, de la Cooperation Suisse, and other technical and financial partners imbedded in Chad" (p. 3)
	United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks (*Cadre operationnel d'assistance au developpement interimaire des Nations Unies au Tchad 2012-2013*); developed by Chad and UN based on increased crises in the region; focus on provision of basic social services for all people living in Chad territory to include health, education, and water purification
	National Education Plans (*Plan d'action national d'alphabetisation du Tchad (2012-2015)*); developed by Chad; management of the subsector for literacy will be by the private company "Faire-Faire" based on advice from technical advisors and private providers in 2000; government will monitor and support with materials and local communities will support the literacy efforts; major problem with low qualifications of staff; risk of discontinuing literacy program (p. 13); plan to improve quality of literacy program and alternative programs

Notes: Author's translation of documents. (Gouvernment of Chad, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2012a, 2012b; Gouvernment of Chad & UNESCO, 2012).

Figure 1. Political Regions of Chad

Note: According to the WB (2013b, p. 7), "Interventions will focus on six (out of 22) regions: (1) Mandoul (M), (2) Mayo Kebbi Est (MKE), (3) Mayo Kebbi Ouest (MKO), (4) Tandjile (T), (5) Hadjer Lamis (HL) and (6) N'Djamena (N). Although these are neither the poorest nor the most disadvantaged regions in terms of education outcomes, the most disadvantaged and poorest regions are covered through the two projects, and the geographical targeting for PARSET 2 took into consideration complementarity with other activities rather than only beneficiary vulnerabilities."

Today, Chad's education system reflects the stagnated agency and external dependence of the national government. The external education provider documents available tend to focus on their own organization priorities. The WB documents describe increasing efficiencies in primary school completion; the UN documents similarly describe a focus on increasing literacy rates. The WB does specify the primary and upper secondary education efforts—without mention of lower secondary provisions—which focuses 80% on sciences and 20% on knowledge development despite Chad's basic literacy rate of 35.4% between 2008 and 2013 (UNICEF, 2013). The financial plan to fulfill the WB and UN goals relies on external funding for 26% of

the estimated expenditures which included an expected shortfall of 17% for 2013-2015 (WB 2013a). The WB and UN also prioritize increased human capital, but do not seem to address short or long term concerns of identity development, agency via local participation, or other concepts generally associated with social justice and self-sustainment which were articulated in Chad's first, internally focused constitutions.

ANALYSIS

Given the above political and education circumstances in Chad, it is possible to discuss this article's initial theoretical arguments first from the community-based school perspective. Each of Chad's 22 regions have educational needs which should, according to Rousseau's traditional or Fraser's post-Westphalian social contract, be addressed and met by the Republic of Chad. The education component of the country's 22 communities' individual social justice prioritizations for redistribution, recognition, and participatory justice (Fraser, 2005) are in a struggle for satisfaction with the other Chadian regions' prioritizations. They are also in a struggle with other national government priorities such as national security, clean water, and a conducive business environment for improving economic and employment opportunities. When external organizations enter the equation, invited by the government elites (World Bank, 2013b), each community's priorities are now in a larger struggle with the various priorities of each external entity and its shareholders to which the external entity must answer. The voice of each non-community entity makes the voice of each community less powerful and more difficult to be addressed and satiated. Therefore, each external program or entity weakens the tacitly mandated responsibility of the government in its social contract agreement with its citizens and communities. The Chadian government's democratic deficit, therefore, increases exponentially based on external participants over time.

The Ministry of Education social justice perspectives, as the representative of the national government for education, are likely different than the perspectives of the community. Based on a WB end of program report from 2013, four national education ministers were appointed during a five-year span (World Bank, 2013b). None of them had a background in education, and several did not have senior management experience (Schweitzer, 2013). In fact, none of the documents signed between the government and EEPs were signed by the Minister of Education.

Even with the recognition that different governments have different administrative practices, and that many positions within NESD governments are staffed by people with less than ideal qualifications, such a turnover rate in leadership makes program and program goal continuity difficult at best. Technical assistants and program managers are often welcomed as education experts to whom governments can delegate responsibility for all or part of the education sector. Unofficial delegation or deference happens especially if the manager is from a country or organization with a more mature education system or if the technical assistant is from a western country. However, the assistant's amount of education and or lack of experience in development can often lead them to focus on results and outcomes to the detriment of focusing on increasing local education institutions and local education manager capabilities. Such was likely the case with this paper's three opening incidents.

The IFIs perspectives are those of any financial institution: the contracted education services are business transactions where the IFI, as an investor, is interested primarily in developing a market to, at some point, increase profits. Many times, local citizen education is a means to that end by providing a better work force in the relatively short to medium term and to produce consumers in the longer term. Education sector idealists, as well as laypersons and citizens, often attribute altruistic motives to IFIs and international corporations which appraise investment and loan projects in terms of expected direct and or indirect return on investment. Therefore, when education sector entities are contracted in three to five-year increments, the IFI business perspective encourages reporting positive results. Business and government financial and operations models differ. The government's ability to change its processes, especially in authoritarian and or fragile contexts such as Chad, can be slow. Often the changes are slower than the projected business plan rate of return on investment which can lead to frustrated investors or practitioners who might bypass, and therefore undermine, the national education ministry. The national social justice desires and the community with which IFIs are projected to work are often incompatible in terms of results or timeliness.

A final word is offered on recipient government perspectives. It is not unheard of for recipient government bureaucrats to have the idea that if an external entity wants a particular program or goal to be adopted by the recipient government, the external entity should provide the support for the program. This can be a powerful negotiating tool for the government. As a real

example, in 2004 Chad's revenues from the oil sector began to flow into national coffers largely based on a pipeline financed by the WB. The parties initially agreed that Chad would use its new resources to alleviate poverty through programs such as investing in schools. However, in 2006, Chad's Parliament voted to prioritize spending the oil revenue on the military and other government programs outside of both internal and external oversight. The WB president stopped funding the existing loans to Chad in all sectors—including education—because the WB believed Chad was not putting enough of its own money toward educating its own citizens as well as the refugees in three large camps within Chad's sovereign borders (Dugger, 2006). The government of Chad essentially reminded the WB that Chad was a sovereign entity, and if the WB wanted Chadian people and refugees educated, the WB could provide the resources itself. The WB closed its projects in Chad for several months, a deal was renegotiated, and the WB restarted its programs. However, in 2008, the WB officially ended its programs stating, "The government did not allocate adequate resources critical for poverty reduction" (Polgreen, 2008, para 4).

In situations like the WB-Chad standoff, the question can be raised of whether the government of Chad is moving toward its own version of social justice at the international level by forcing the WB to recognize its sovereignty and by forcing the WB to allow Chad's participation in its own governance. Non-negotiations or brinksmanship tactics such as this can be seen as a type of informal government outsourcing responsibility to provide education social services. This is true especially if one is using Fraser's reconstruction of government and responsibilities away from Westphalian social contract models. When the same WB-Chad situation is viewed from a Chadian community, the education provision source may not matter if none of the available providers (internal or external) recognize the citizens, respect their participation, or redistribute education in a way that is meaningful for them.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

As with any changes in policy, the first step is countering paradigms and conceptions of the issue. Individuals or organizations can have language or actions that show they subscribe to an unflattering and stereotypical conceptualization or Afro-pessimism (de Beer, 2010; Eyoh,

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1998; Onwudiwe & Ibelema, 2003; Gordon & Wolpe, 1998) expressed colloquially as "this is Africa" or TIA (Evans & Glenn, 2010, p. 26). Afro-pessimism and TIA can loosely be understood as a way for listing the continent's shortfalls: there has always been and always will be corruption, disorganization, war, disease, and the need for other countries to help Africa and Africans. Many of the institutional structures from colonialism and precolonial ideas of Africa's characteristics are rolled into Afro-pessimism and have survived the immediately post-independence era without mentally moving away from colonial concepts and constructs or, as noted author N'gugi wa Thiong'o (1986) termed it, *decolonizing the mind*. The decolonization process has been taken up in many formerly colonized countries as a process of rejecting imperialism and its imprint on both governments and societies (Smith, 1999). Decolonization researchers and literature are widely available to laymen, academics, and practitioners who can use the concepts to address individual and institutional programs and structures built on the TIA fallacy. Further and more specific to academia, the literature on decolonization can be closely linked to literature on path dependency which can be instructive in understanding the political, historic, and sociological causes of many current situations of postcolonial countries. Path dependency is a political science idea that a country is destined to continue in the direction or practices on which it was founded. The concept has tended to be overused by laymen in a superficial manner negating the deeper analysis which is available through its use (Kay, 2005). Kay's (2005) academic and practitioner path dependency overuse critique is offered not to discourage the use of path dependency as an analytic tool but is offered instead as a caution to avoid the conceptual misuse. The purpose is also to discourage using path dependency to reinforce stereotypes found within the *this is Africa* paradigm.

The second offered consideration focuses on dismantling and countering dependence theory by requiring as much work on the donor side as on the recipient side. Dr. Dembisa Moyo's book, *Dead Aid* (2010) was arguably the first best-selling book aimed at showing the donor community the detriment of large-scale dependence of African countries on external aid. After Moyo's literary proclamation, many in the development and philanthropy sectors called her work "wrong headed" (Gershon, 2009, para. 2), "dishonest" (Hoebink, 2009, p. 6), "lazy" and "at worst mendacious" (Barder, 2009, para. 3). Most notably, donors like businessman and philanthropist Bill Gates dismissed her work by declaring all the good his foundation had done

for individuals. Gates did not address the growing democratic deficit of the national governments the Gates Foundation impacted which was Moyo's major argument (Moyo, 2013). Most African leaders did not respond to the book. According to Moyo, this is because these leaders had been profiting personally from the difference between the aid money given and the few pennies in actual aid and programs delivered to citizens. She argued that stopping the massive flows of long-term aid would cut the corrupt leaders' dependence as well as the IFIs' dependence because the IFIs receive repayment on their investments whether the programs produced education outcomes or not (WithTheEconomist, 2012).

The final consideration is dismantling suzerain-based lack of social justice in education by countering dependency with advocacy. Specifically, advocacy for more equitable power education policy control redistribution could be a necessary but daunting possibility for the entities at all levels of analysis with respect to Chad. Moving the government away from authoritarianism and dependency can be accomplished slowly in small increments. The concept of progressive incrementalism originated with climate change theorists but is now being applied to the social sciences and policy studies. Progressive incrementalism is an analytic mechanism which could be used at each level of analysis, both foreign and domestic, of Chad's education system within the nominally democratic government. As a theoretical summary, Howlett and Cashore (2007) researched the process of change and noted alternative mechanisms to cataclysmic policy shifts:

> a "neo-homeostatic" [change] in which paradigmatic changes occur through endogenous shifts in goals; a "quasi-homeostatic" in which exogenous factors influence changes in objectives and settings; and a "thermostatic" [or progressive incremental] one in which durable policy objectives requires that settings adapt to exogenous changes. (p. 33)

Previous development programs toward NESD countries have followed the thermostatic or progressive incremental mechanism emphasizing exogenous change through loan conditionalities as with the Chad-WB standoff. The authors admonish practitioners using thermostatic change to not overlook endogenous change processes within existing institutions. A possible creative solution for Chad's education system, which would decrease its democratic deficit, would be for external education entities to better understand and work with neo-homeostatic change programs to maximize change using existing organizational and cultural

change mechanisms. Such an endeavor would require extensive investment not of money but of time and personnel resources. This change in focus might not be popular since it would change most IFI's rate of return on investment calculus currently in use. However, the changes made using Howlett and Cashore's (2007) models are likely to be more in line with the local values and therefore more socially appropriate, fully inculcated, and sustainable. Incremental change is also less disruptive to fragile governments and allows time to build resilience as well as time for concept socialization to leaders at all government and donor levels.

Ideas for citizens to encourage greater social justice levels regarding education in NESD countries by introducing incremental change is difficult especially in countries like Chad which have a recent history of active social and political repression. Other creative solutions, such as grassroots movements and leveraging regional countries to bring pressure to bear on the government, are not likely to work in authoritarian government contexts. If lower level protest measures were a viable possibility, social media could be used as with the Arab Spring and the Rhodes Must Fall movement to encourage significant changes to the government's education policies. Alternatively, large-scale, vocal protests against authoritarian-type governments which have been successful have not been without cost. Governments in Kenya, Egypt, and Cameroon fought back against social and political protests with batons and bullets. These governments also shut down access to the internet. Peaceful change is likely to take more time than a few weeks of impassioned marches.

Social justice at both the domestic and international level will likely be centered on changing the perspectives of government elites. Social elites and political leaders can put the national government in the vanguard position of giving their country voice and autonomy in the international stage while simultaneously providing agency and development for their own citizens. If those in positions of power and authority can be shown the long-term benefit of functional national sovereignty as being in their own interests, they are more likely to participate in restructuring national resources for their own and their populations' benefit. Social changes, and therefore education changes, in how a country or its people develop takes time. Change is most long lasting when the change is implemented from the foundation. However, since each country and people change in accordance with the norms of their culture, accommodation for change from the elite levels in authoritarian governments combined with community level

change must be made. External entities in all areas would do well to respect changes in African or authoritarian countries which may not align with external proscriptions. More and more often in recent time, African institutions and individuals have affected social justice goals in their own ways. The people of Zimbabwe peacefully walked President Mugabe out of office after more than 30 years in position. A community of west African leaders walked Gambian President Jalloh out of office at the behest of Gambian citizens. Social justice was served from the foundational people affected. Social justice was supported, not dictated, from external entities.

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DECLARATION OF CONFLICTING INTERESTS

All statements of fact, analysis, or opinion are the author's and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or any of its components, or the U.S. government.

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