Religion and the Public University

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It seems almost commonplace now, in the second decade of the twenty-first century, to bemoan the crisis facing public higher education in America. Funding at the federal and state levels—sometimes in decline, sometimes on the rise—feels more tenuous than ever. To entice new students, colleges and universities have been creating and revamping majors, expanding study-abroad programs and internship options, and opening new recreational and research facilities, all while increasing tuition at rates well above inflation. And we have recently been witness to a disturbing set of public shadings as schools disclose a culture of statistical inflation in pursuit of higher rankings in U.S. News and World Report (Pérez-Peña and Slotnik 2012). The 2008 fiscal crisis and the fraught relationship between Congress and the White House have only added urgency to this already agitated discussion.

Many reasons can explain the anxiety about the future of public higher education. This paper addresses one cause that is often unmentioned. It is my worry that millions of Americans who regard religion as central to their lives may have become disenchanted with and disenfranchised by public higher education. For one example among many, Liberty University in Virginia, founded by the Baptist preacher Jerry Falwell in 1971, has doubled its student body twice since 2007 alone. It now educates more than 60,000 students each semester—a far greater number than some of the largest public universities (Anderson 2013). Religious Americans who attend or send their children to parochial schools of higher education do not see their moral or political views reflected in or valued by public academia, which is often seen as dominated by left-of-center voices. I believe that this sense of disenfranchisement leads religious Americans to send more and more of their children to private denominationally-affiliated colleges and seminaries instead of public universities.

This essay is organized into two major parts. To provide an overview of the crisis facing American higher education, I begin by discussing two representative texts, *The University in Ruins* by Bill Readings and *The Marketplace of Ideas* by Louis Menand. These books describe different sets of problems and propose divergent (though complementary) kinds of solutions. The essay then takes up a vision of the university presented in the 1790s by the German philosopher Immanuel Kant and compares his view with recent writings by the contemporary social psychologist Jonathan Haidt. I conclude by using these texts to suggest how public higher education could better accommodate religious Americans.

Bill Readings and the University of Economics

Two books on public education, one by the late literary scholar Bill Readings and the other by the cultural historian Louis Menand, present broad critiques of the contemporary public university. In a way, these two authors create a tension with each other. For Readings, the university functions primarily as a filter for creating and credentialing capitalist workers; for Menand, the university is structurally anachronistic and detached from the demands of contemporary life. A look at these two books provides an outline of the dominant discourses of alarm. It also suggests the reasons that words like “morality,” “God,” “nation,” and “truth” (common tropes for religious Americans) tend to be excluded from the debate about the condition and future of public higher education.

Readings’ primary contention is that, by the final decade of the twentieth century, the university had been transformed from an institution conveying what he calls “culture” to an institution promoting...
something he calls “excellence.” By “culture,” Readings means a sort of nation-state ethos, a narrative played on the accomplishments – including the history and the literature and art – of the political and geographical entity in which a university was founded and had matured. The idea of culture as the object of higher education, in Readings’ view, is an inheritance of largely German origin. Readings lays particular emphasis on Alexander Humboldt’s nineteenth century reorganization of the University of Berlin, a model that Readings contends was exported to America.

According to Readings, the university as conveyor and protector of culture reached its high-water mark during the Cold War, when America countered Soviet propaganda through a triumphal retelling of the Western liberal narrative. Readings is no wide-eyed supporter of that narrative, but he does see within it a promising view in which higher education is attuned to the need of students to identify with a common social mission – a view in which the university is dedicated to playing a role in history and not simply in the economy.

The conversion of the university of culture into a university of excellence is Readings’ overwhelming concern. “Excellence” represents many things for Readings, one of them being a metaphor for how vapid contemporary education has proven itself to be. Because “excellence” can be and often is applied without discernment, it follows happily along with the market takeover of higher education. Even the venerable and ancient Oxford, Readings laments, has begun to call itself “excellent,” perhaps because its own specific cultural inheritances (England, monarchy, empire, male dons, etc.) have been discredited. Oxford no longer seems to have anything to offer but its ability to train workers for service in multinational corporations or public bureaucracies. According to Readings, “The social responsibility of the University, its accountability to society, is solely a matter of services rendered for a fee.”

Readings’ alternative to the university of excellence is not a return to the university of culture. The forces of globalization and trans-nationalism, he believes, are too strong for any appeal to the notions of a geographically bounded culture. He is also wary of giving the “ruined” university over to the aesthetes and the romantics – the descendants of those who idealized and codified Humboldt’s vision of the nineteenth century university. In these avoidances Readings’ book is post-modern in the deepest sense, comprehending the extraordinary lengths we have come from the beginning to the end of the twentieth century and positing as the future of higher education a series of fragmented if overlapping places of learning not linked by a hierarchical appeal to a cultural community or by a quest for an enduring truth. His proposals would allow the public university

Figure 1: Liberty University in Virginia
(Source: EOverbey, Creative Commons license BY-SA 3.0)
to continue as a semi-autonomous institution within the borders of (in his view) an increasingly meaningless nation-state politics, but seizing the opportunity that fragmentation presents to diversify and broaden thought.

To those on the political left, Readings view of public higher education as a fragmented but somehow interacting patchwork of discourse communities may seem like the logical response to the devastations of the twentieth century. To the religious right, however, his view represents a capitulation to an idea of intrinsic human limitation (and a recognition of our failure at civilization itself) that is not reflected in their theology or in their reading of history. By dismissing the idea of the university as a place where a set of truths can be discovered and human society perfected, Readings is excluding the university from participating in the social renewal and redemption envisioned by the religious right. His analysis allows the religious right not only to dismiss the university as flawed but to refuse to use its ruins for another project, such as the one Readings advocates. Instead the religious right treks through the ruins (or around them) in search of new ground on which to build its own future for higher education.6

Louis Menand and the University of Anachronism

In his short volume *The Marketplace of Ideas*, Louis Menand focuses on a different (though adjoining) set of problems afflicting the contemporary university – and offers a much more encouraging analysis of their origins and potential solutions. *Marketplace* is divided into four chapters, each depicting a particular aspect of the crisis whose resolution Menand predicts could at least mitigate a more general disaster. Menand asks: (1) What are the virtues and deceptions of a general education curriculum? (2) How and why did the humanities find itself in the position of questioning its own relevance? (3) What does the zeal for “interdisciplinarity” tell us about the professoriate? (4) Why do the great majority of professors and graduate students have similar left-leaning politics? While each chapter is worthy of its own explication, what is most relevant here is the intellectual framework Menand brings to his analysis and conclusions. Menand appeals – as does Readings – primarily to those already inclined to accept a basic assumption: that the university is a Balkanized assortment of departments unmoored from the promotion of morals and indifferent to the advancement of any cultural tradition, persuasion, or social or historical mission.

Throughout the book it is Menand’s contention that, although universities rapidly expanded and diversified after World War II, they retained the same patterns and structures as prewar universities – the schools founded during the decades on either side of the turn of the twentieth century. He argues that this method of expansion on an inherited pattern was not problematic for the postwar university; what society needed from its schools of higher education was simply massive growth – first for the returning GIs, then for the baby boomers – and not radical transformation. Universities expanded because of a new combination of federal grant money (for both education and research) and a broad network of cultural support. Indeed, in the postwar years, the university became one of the primary modes for middle class advancement, not by transforming the cultural capital historically preserved for the elites but instead by distributing it more widely than ever in history.

Menand calls 1970 a tipping point, when the student population ceased to expand and support for the liberal arts began to disappear. Instead of beginning to adjust to what would prove a long–term trend toward fewer students, fewer academic jobs, less government money, and less social prestige, universities persisted in their now bloated and maladjusted postwar configurations. Despite the intellectual and social revolutions of the 1960s and 1970s, the professoriate – comfortable with the model inherited from its all-male, all-white intellectual forbears – proved satisfied with the status quo and persisted to reproduce what they had inherited, making marginal adjustments only when forced to do so in the cultural and technological context of a vastly different world.
Menand’s *Marketplace* is a response to this complacency. He sees the reforms of the earlier twentieth century as answering the right questions for their time. The changes made to expand research and education were bold and brave, he says, and no one questions that what they created was a recognizable university, honoring the past while embracing the present. He wants our generation to take the same courageous steps, to do what those early reformers did but in the context of a globalized information age.

Menand’s book, which is concerned wholly with elite universities, exemplifies a common theory about the crisis of the university: that there is more or less complete similarity between the role or mission of Harvard in American society and that of public universities, such as the University of California or the University of North Carolina. And, thus far, history has mostly followed along: the movement of faculty between the elite privates and publics assumes no separation. Menand’s is an excellent book about reforming Harvard and Yale; it is an unsuitable book, however, for thinking about the future of public higher education in a fractured and religious democracy.

**Kant on the Conflict of the Faculties**

Immanuel Kant’s *The Conflict of the Faculties* (1798), written as three essays over the course of half a decade, provides an intimate psychological portrait of academic life at the end of the eighteenth century. *Conflict* is in many ways an early anthropological study of the associations among professors at Kant’s own University of Königsberg, but it is likewise a broader theoretical critique of the relationship between scholars, scholarship, public intellectual responsibility, and the governing State. No matter the numerous intellectual arguments concerning the validity of Kant’s philosophical theories or the attempts to position him within a certain (to some) now-troublesome branch of Western metaphysics, Kant’s writings continue to exert an extraordinary authority in Western academic discourse. In that sense, *Conflict* presents a serious and still-relevant treatise on the organization and place of the university within a broader national society.

The overriding schema of Kant’s *The Conflict of the Faculties* is the (then-extant) division of university faculties (what we now call colleges or schools) into “higher” and “lower.” Theology, law, and medicine constituted the higher faculties at Kant’s university; philosophy (including all of what are now the humanities and the social and natural sciences) filled out the lower faculties. In each essay, Kant positions the “philosophy faculty” in conflict with one of the three higher faculties, separating the intellectual contributions of the two sets of faculties through their nearness to what he calls “reason alone.”

In no way is Kant a passive observer in these texts – he is an active partisan for the philosophy faculty, strongly anti-theology and overwhelmingly dismissive of law and medicine as capable of producing true knowledge. Yet despite his biases, Kant’s argument is not intended to upend the structure of the university; it seeks to promote philosophy as the ultimate source of rational knowledge for national success: “For without a [philosophy] faculty of this kind, the truth would not come to light (and this would be to the government’s own detriment).”

What is striking about Confl i c t to us in the academy now is the importance of the high-low structure in relating university scholarship to the State (which in eighteenth-century Prussia meant an absolute monarchy). The higher faculties, “both as to their content [i.e., scholarship] and the way they are expounded to the public,” are observed by and interact with the ruling government. In other words, the higher faculties, while ostensibly remaining part of the university, are drafted into the service of the state for responsibilities beyond the pursuit of reason alone – such as educating ruling ministers, imparting theological or judicial judgment, or healing the sick. Kant recognizes the necessity of the higher faculties for the overall welfare of the State; indeed, they are the people who shield the philosophers from the oversight of government. For Kant, however, the higher faculties remain ever shallow and perfunctory distributors of second-hand, impure knowledge, interested somewhat in reason but also beholden to power, diplomacy, and a host of other responsibilities. If their knowledge is proven wrong they need appeal only to the phrase: my instructions came from the sovereign himself.

In juxtaposition Kant describes the activities and freedoms of the lower faculty. Philosophy is the primary teacher of the higher faculties, distributing knowledge upwards; but philosophy likewise looks to its own ends, following truth and reason wherever they may lead. “[T]he philosophy faculty, because it must answer for the truth of the teachings it is to
adopt or even allow, must be conceived as free and
subject only to laws given by reason, not by the
government.” In Kant's conception, philosophy
enjoys a freedom of thought and thus acts on an
amorphous plane somewhere below the direct gaze of
the government. It is a plane not isolated from
society, only generally disregarded by it. Kant
envisions the arguments and exchanges of
philosophers as having a radiant effect, first by
convincing the higher faculties of certain new truths
(as they are discovered) and then indirectly when the
higher faculty in turn influences the government and
its activities.

The “conflicts” of Kant’s title are the
discrepancies and subsequent arguments between the
philosopher’s truths (which Kant assumes are always
correct) and the higher faculties’ “truths” (which are
likely tainted – as government’s ends are different
than the ends of reason alone). It is the responsibility
of philosophy to maintain these conflicts, thereby
hoping to move the higher faculties and the
government evermore toward the truths discovered
through reason. Indeed, Kant’s ultimate goal is not
the destruction of the hierarchical university system
but a switching of the importance of the faculties,
with philosophy (still oriented only toward pure
reason) directly advising the government; and
theology, law, and medicine (still perfunctory
knowledges) merely seeing to the daily needs of the
citizenry.

What becomes apparent as the essays proceed is
how rapidly the juxtaposition initially posed fades into
degrees of difference. In essence, the faculties are
fundamentally the same species; the tensions between
them prove not detrimental but essential to the
balance of government and its relationship to (true)
knowledge. Philosophy’s rational knowledge (because
it remains within the jurisdiction of the monarch and
even attempts to have influence on it) is only slightly
less deferential to the State than that propounded by
the higher faculties.

According to Kant, philosophy cannot challenge
the authority of the State in any profound way. To see
this, imagine that through reason philosophy
discovered a radical new governing structure. The
government would either need to transform itself
completely or reject these findings outright. The latter
is the likelier option, whereupon philosophy would
lose even its minor influence and all the “conflicts”
would have been for naught. But Kant’s philosophy
never discovers the radical option. His are not
utopian dreams. Kant’s reason leads to a more perfect
monarch and a more just monarchical state. And such
being the case, the inversion of the faculties appears
an achievable, even laudable, endeavor.

This conservatism provides one of the keys to
apply Kant’s system to American public higher
education. The university at its core (then or now) is
not designed to revolutionize the governing apparatus
of the state. It is instead more akin to an
informational feedback loop, the one attempting to
influence the other and in turn being itself influenced.
Implicit in this balancing system is the unique
situation of the university as partially self-governed.
There is equilibrium in Kant’s system, a recognition
that the primary elements that composed Prussian
society are somehow represented by the various
members of the semi-autonomous university
community. “The people conceive of their
welfare…as [the realization of] their natural ends and
so as these three things: being happy after death
[theology], having their possessions guaranteed by
public laws during their life in society [law], and
finally, looking forward to the physical enjoyment of
life itself (that is, health and a long life) [medicine].”

For American public higher education this
equilibrium between university and society has
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itself to the sciences.

One can quibble with Kant’s condescending tone
toward the general citizenry, but his underlying
argument is strong: the needs of the society are
likewise the address of the university. One is not
divorced from the other. Kant is clearly an advocate
for the society’s need to change (indeed, for it to
become more like philosophy), yet Kant would never
expect the university to divorce itself from society
simply because its interests are not the same as those
of the populace.

For American public higher education this
equilibrium (between university and society) has
vanished. The theology faculty has been excised, and
the humanities faculty (titular heir to “philosophy”) has
ceded much of itself to the hard and soft sciences
– especially those disciplines funded by federal agencies – and no longer regards itself as the path of pure reason. I am not interested here in debating the legitimacy of these decisions. Rather, I am interested only in their consequences for the public university as an institution in the United States.

**Jonathan Haidt on Group Morality**

In 2007, Jonathan Haidt and Jesse Graham published an article in which they identified “five psychological foundations of morality;” that is, five broad categories within which humans (as part of cultural groups) make fundamental decisions about their beliefs and actions. Haidt and Graham labeled these foundations “harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity,” where each grouping is designed to include a subset of cultural attitudes and practices. Harm/care and fairness/reciprocity are identified through terms like social justice, individual freedom, rights, and welfare; they are the buzzwords of political liberalism and social activism. Ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity are manifest in calls to patriotism, respect for elders, expectations of chastity, and rules about women’s bodies; they are the recurring tropes of the religious right.

**The insight here – or the principal hypothesis – is that liberals and religious conservatives stress different moral foundations when making political judgments and setting policy.**

Haidt and Graham present data that convinced them of one way to explain why liberals (as Haidt labels himself) and conservatives in American politics always seem to be speaking past one another, and why Democrats do not more often win elections when – intrinsically and on the face of it – their policies are designed to help a larger and more needy percentage of the population. In their study, Haidt and Graham noticed that in America, people who self-identified as on the political left continually stressed two of the five moral categories: harm/care and fairness/reciprocity. They also noticed that the more religiously conservative a respondent self-identified, the more evenly spread was his or her concern across the spectrum of all five moral foundations. The insight here – or the principal hypothesis – is that liberals and religious conservatives stress different moral foundations when making political judgments and setting policy.

In various places, most recently in a newly published book (2012), Haidt argues against interpreting these data as one of a secular/religious divide. Instead, he urges that the best analyses are those that label this left/right divide as between different (and competing) theological agendas, one focused almost entirely on harm/care and fairness/reciprocity, the other spread more evenly among all five (harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity). He and Graham write: “As a first approximation, political liberals value virtues based on the first two foundations (harm/care, fairness/reciprocity), while political conservatives value virtues based on all five…. Conservatives have many moral concerns that liberals simply do not recognize as moral concerns.”

These are striking statements, all the more so because they focus on conservative moral expansiveness rather than conservative parochialism. Haidt and Graham argue that conservatives do understand the left’s moral arguments, but when designing a moral imaginary (e.g. a political platform or an academic curriculum) they place far less value (two-fifths as opposed to one whole) on the first two moral foundations. This imbalance has major consequences for the left/right divide in American society.

Of fundamental importance is Haidt and Graham’s next insight: the moral values expressed by conservatives are not invisible to liberals – they are morals values liberals often rebrand as repulsive or frightening social flaws. The importance conservatives place on “the United States” as an entity and on “American culture” specifically makes sense within a discourse community that has become almost incomprehensible to liberals. Haidt and Graham write: “patriotic displays, respect for authority, or chastity…[these] topics might even make [liberals] feel uneasy, evoking associations with political…movements that limit the autonomy and free expression of the individual.” What the authors are arguing is that for moral conservatives, the State (i.e. country and flag) is a necessary and vibrant part of their social and ethical organization. With theology, moral conservatives unite the two main pieces of
their social unit: God and nation. Without theology, the moral center is lost into an undifferentiated world of half-truths and lurking falsehoods.

Words like “tradition,” “respect,” “nation,” “God,” “family,” “chastity” – these are conservative trail markers for historical connection and ontological foundation. The point in contention is not that traditions change over time and that signs and symbols and tribal loyalties get altered. What Haidt’s research suggests is that the three additional moral foundations are – in an authentically deep way – counteracting forces to cultural fluidity. They are stabilizing mechanisms in a chaotic world of shifting alliances.7

Toward a Public University for All

The relation – or conflict – between the faculties in Kant’s university smoothly maps onto the five moral foundations Haidt identifies. The theology faculty reflects the moral categories of authority/respect and purity/sanctity; it appeals to people’s sense of social correctness and to their ontological security. Kant ridicules theology for mattering only in people’s care for the afterlife. This is unfair but revealing. For anyone to be a candidate for the afterlife means that the powers and beliefs of the living world must be ordered (or ordered enough) not to hinder a person’s acceptable passing. This is a religious stability founded both on the authority of tradition and its presumed sanctity (through history, text, and miracle) in the eyes of God. Indeed, these are moral foundations almost impossible to fulfill in any other way.

The interaction of law and medicine with the government is a manifestation of ingroup/loyalty. In modern parlance, ingroup/loyalty is the most “tribal” of the moral foundations; it involves making decisions within and for a system primarily because one is born into that system. Law and medicine have public responsibilities because they possess skills necessary for the proper functioning of a complex society. Theirs is a loyalty to fellow citizen manifest through the government. Today we call this civic duty. And these duties are complimented by the philosophy faculty’s subtle influence over their actions – and thereby over the government’s – in fulfillment of philosophy’s partial role in the maintenance of fairness/reciprocity. Kant is very clear that the more often philosophy’s rational truths are conveyed to the government, the more enlightened and fair that governance will be. Kant draws a direct line between philosophy’s importance and the proper (i.e., equitable and charitable) running of government.

The public university has structurally excluded itself from acknowledging a divergent – or, in fact, a more comprehensive – set of moral foundations.

One can easily identify three main structural changes to the university since Kant’s day: the loss of a theology faculty; the absence of the influence of the academic humanities over the common culture; and the humanities’ lack of interest in the search for enduring truth. Today, to a great degree, the humanities faculty is united on the liberal side (harm/care and fairness/reciprocity) of Haidt’s outline. The removal of an overt theology curriculum at public universities, along with the suppression of purity and nation-oriented/group loyalty language among academics, has upset the relations mapped so carefully by Kant between university-based knowledge, public responsibility, and the State. The harm/care commitment remains fully a part of the entire contemporary university, epitomized by the myriad departments focused on human well-being, and the administrative offices devoted to student life, psychological and emotional health, community safety, and the like. The fairness/reciprocity axis remains strong as well, though now felt in the emphasis on civil rights and human equality and seen in the guise of multiculturalism, promotion of diversity within student populations, study-abroad programs, social activism, and charitable service, to name a few.

As Haidt’s research suggests, the neglect of three parts of the five-part moral value system results in the alienation of many members of society who might otherwise support public higher education. In essence, the American public university has placed itself in the position of appealing strongly to the core liberal moral foundations (harm/care and fairness/reciprocity) and not at all to the other three moral foundations (ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity) conservatives also
embrace. To put this thought in terms of the discussion of Readings and Menand above, the public university has ceased to be concerned with the entire range of cultural processes and become now, on the one hand, a means for economic professionalization, and on the other, the bastion of a morally narrow professoriate. The public university has structurally excluded itself from acknowledging a divergent – or, in fact, a more comprehensive – set of moral foundations. Sadly, it could be said (almost polemically) that football and basketball teams represent all that is left of the possibility of cultural cohesion on college campuses.

The impact of this structural realignment of the public university is what I called at the beginning of this essay “disenfranchisement.” The expectation that religious conservatives will participate in a public university that is wholly dedicated to less than half of their moral universe appears unlikely and even patronizing. What Haidt’s research shows is that moral intuitions are discovered in groups and societies not just in individuals. Moral intuitions do not necessarily compel a search for ultimate truth, but they do call for the maintenance of a historical trajectory and a sense of legitimacy. If a conversation between the conflicting responsibilities of the public university is to begin, this may be the place to begin it.

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Notes:

1For one example among many, see Capaldi 2011.

2From Sonnenberg 2004: “Among postsecondary institutions, the federal share [of educational expenditures] declined from 18 percent in FY 1980 to 14 percent in FY 1990 and then rose to 19 percent in FY 2003.” From National Conference of State Legislatures 2010: “According to research conducted by the State Higher Education Executive Officers (SHEEO), educational appropriations per full-time student reached a high of $7,961 in FY 2001, followed by four years of decline from FY 2002 to FY 2005 (after the 2001 recession). Per student funding then increased in fiscal years 2006, 2007 and 2008, recovering to $7,220. In FY 2009, appropriations per student fell by 4 percent due to the onset of the latest recession and declined to $6,928 per student as states struggled with massive revenue shortfalls. Appropriations per student remained lower in FY 2009 (in constant dollars) than in most years since FY 1980.”

3In 1980/1, average tuition at a two- or four-year undergraduate institution was (adjusted for inflation) $7,759; in 2010/11, it was $31,395. “Tuition costs of colleges and universities,” National Center for Educational Statistics, accessed April 25, 2013, http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=76.

4Perhaps the most important book to describe this phenomenon is Riley 2005.

5In Fall 1980, 9,457,394 students attended public institutions of higher education; 1,006,173 students attended religiously affiliated institutions. In Fall 2009, 14,810,642 students attended public institutions of higher education; 1,811,947 students attended religiously affiliated institutions. Between 1980 and 2010 the number of public institutions of higher education increased by 159; the number of religiously affiliated institutions increased by 117. “Fall enrollment and number of degree-granting institutions, by control and affiliation of institution: Selected years, 1980 through 2010,” National Center for Education Statistics, accessed April 25, 2013, http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d11/tables/dt11_206.asp.

6Orol Roberts University (founded 1963) and Liberty University (founded 1971) are excellent examples of this phenomenon. “College should be a time of discovery, growth and fun. At ORU it’s all that and more. Through development of your mind, body and spirit, the ORU experience is designed to help you grow as a whole person, ignite your leadership skills and prepare you to impact the world for good. This is your time. ORU is your place.” From the Orol Roberts website, accessed April 25, 2013, http://www.oru.edu/oru_experience/.

7Haidt writes: “religion and political leadership are so intertwined across eras and cultures because they are about the same thing: performing the miracle of converting unrelated individuals into a group… The three Durkheimian foundations (ingroup, authority, and purity) play a crucial role in most religions. When they are banished entirely from political life, what remains is a nation of individuals striving to maximize utility while respecting the rules. What remains is a cold but fair social contract, which can easily degenerate into a nation of shoppers” (Haidt 2008).

Sources:


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Kant, Immanuel. 1996. The Conflict of the Faculties. In Religion and Rational Theology, edited by Allen W. Wood and George Di Giovanni. New York: Cambridge University Press. (In his Conflict essays, Kant uses the German word Fakultät, understood as the organization and profession of the professoriate at the University, and not geistige Fähigkeit, “faculty,” which Kant uses elsewhere in his philosophical writings to mean “intellectual or mental capacity.”)